The effects of overconfidence in job market signaling - an experimental approach

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Silva, Rita Alexandra Gouveia da
Data de Publicação: 2019
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/66767
Resumo: The job market works under asymmetric information, making it hard for firms to know the real capabilities of the workers they hire. Workers can help overcome this asymmetry by signaling their productivity with investments in education. However, it’s fair to assume that workers sometimes miscalculate their own abilities, which disturbs the functioning of the signal. This study intends to analyze the effects of overconfidence amongst workers on the various parameters of the game by conducting an experiment. The results from the experiment suggest that the profits of both workers and firms will be greatly impaired as a consequence.
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spelling The effects of overconfidence in job market signaling - an experimental approachSignaling gameOverconfidencejob marketEducationDomínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e GestãoThe job market works under asymmetric information, making it hard for firms to know the real capabilities of the workers they hire. Workers can help overcome this asymmetry by signaling their productivity with investments in education. However, it’s fair to assume that workers sometimes miscalculate their own abilities, which disturbs the functioning of the signal. This study intends to analyze the effects of overconfidence amongst workers on the various parameters of the game by conducting an experiment. The results from the experiment suggest that the profits of both workers and firms will be greatly impaired as a consequence.Coutts, AlexanderRUNSilva, Rita Alexandra Gouveia da2019-04-16T10:47:48Z2019-01-172019-01-17T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/66767TID:202209113enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:31:45Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/66767Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:34:34.037167Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The effects of overconfidence in job market signaling - an experimental approach
title The effects of overconfidence in job market signaling - an experimental approach
spellingShingle The effects of overconfidence in job market signaling - an experimental approach
Silva, Rita Alexandra Gouveia da
Signaling game
Overconfidence
job market
Education
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
title_short The effects of overconfidence in job market signaling - an experimental approach
title_full The effects of overconfidence in job market signaling - an experimental approach
title_fullStr The effects of overconfidence in job market signaling - an experimental approach
title_full_unstemmed The effects of overconfidence in job market signaling - an experimental approach
title_sort The effects of overconfidence in job market signaling - an experimental approach
author Silva, Rita Alexandra Gouveia da
author_facet Silva, Rita Alexandra Gouveia da
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Coutts, Alexander
RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Silva, Rita Alexandra Gouveia da
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Signaling game
Overconfidence
job market
Education
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
topic Signaling game
Overconfidence
job market
Education
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
description The job market works under asymmetric information, making it hard for firms to know the real capabilities of the workers they hire. Workers can help overcome this asymmetry by signaling their productivity with investments in education. However, it’s fair to assume that workers sometimes miscalculate their own abilities, which disturbs the functioning of the signal. This study intends to analyze the effects of overconfidence amongst workers on the various parameters of the game by conducting an experiment. The results from the experiment suggest that the profits of both workers and firms will be greatly impaired as a consequence.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-04-16T10:47:48Z
2019-01-17
2019-01-17T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
format masterThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/66767
TID:202209113
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/66767
identifier_str_mv TID:202209113
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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