Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Lommerud, Kjell Erik
Data de Publicação: 2018
Outros Autores: Straume, Odd Rune, Vagstad, Steinar
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/65682
Resumo: We analyse the effects of different labour-market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold-up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. Flexicurity, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk-averse and the hold-up problem is relatively important.
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spelling Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching modelFlexicurityunemployment insuranceSocial SciencesWe analyse the effects of different labour-market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold-up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. Flexicurity, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk-averse and the hold-up problem is relatively important.We thank an anonymous referee for very valuable comments and suggestions. O. R. Straume acknowledges the financial support provided by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the Operational Program Factors of Competitiveness (COMPETE); and by national funds received through the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) under the research grant PEst-C/EGE/UI3182/2013.WileyUniversidade do MinhoLommerud, Kjell ErikStraume, Odd RuneVagstad, Steinar2018-07-012018-07-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/65682engLommerud, K. E., Straume, O. R., & Vagstad, S. (2018, July). Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Wiley. http://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.122440347-052010.1111/sjoe.12244info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:26:54Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/65682Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:21:24.097981Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model
title Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model
spellingShingle Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model
Lommerud, Kjell Erik
Flexicurity
unemployment insurance
Social Sciences
title_short Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model
title_full Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model
title_fullStr Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model
title_full_unstemmed Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model
title_sort Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model
author Lommerud, Kjell Erik
author_facet Lommerud, Kjell Erik
Straume, Odd Rune
Vagstad, Steinar
author_role author
author2 Straume, Odd Rune
Vagstad, Steinar
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lommerud, Kjell Erik
Straume, Odd Rune
Vagstad, Steinar
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Flexicurity
unemployment insurance
Social Sciences
topic Flexicurity
unemployment insurance
Social Sciences
description We analyse the effects of different labour-market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold-up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. Flexicurity, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk-averse and the hold-up problem is relatively important.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-07-01
2018-07-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/65682
url https://hdl.handle.net/1822/65682
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Lommerud, K. E., Straume, O. R., & Vagstad, S. (2018, July). Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Wiley. http://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12244
0347-0520
10.1111/sjoe.12244
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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