Low Complexity Byzantine-Resilient Consensus
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2003 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Tipo de documento: | Relatório |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10451/14237 |
Resumo: | The application of the tolerance paradigm to security intrusion tolerance has been raising a good deal of attention in the dependability and security communities. This paper is concerned with a novel approach to intrusion tolerance. The idea is to use privileged distributed components generically designated by wormholes to support the execution of intrusion-tolerant protocols, often called Byzantine-resilient protocols in the literature. The paper introduces the design of wormhole-aware intrusion-tolerant protocols using a classical distributed systems problem: consensus. The system where the consensus protocol runs is mostly asynchronous and can fail in an arbitrary way, except for the wormhole, which is secure and synchronous. Using the wormhole to execute a few critical steps, the protocol manages to have a low time complexity: in the best case, it runs in a single round, even if some processes are malicious. The protocol is also arguably faster than classical Byzantine protocols, because it does not use public-key cryptography in runtime. The protocol has the interesting feature of not being bound by the FLP impossibility result |
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Low Complexity Byzantine-Resilient ConsensusByzantine fault toleranceintrusion tolerancedistributed systems modelsdistributed algorithmsconsensusThe application of the tolerance paradigm to security intrusion tolerance has been raising a good deal of attention in the dependability and security communities. This paper is concerned with a novel approach to intrusion tolerance. The idea is to use privileged distributed components generically designated by wormholes to support the execution of intrusion-tolerant protocols, often called Byzantine-resilient protocols in the literature. The paper introduces the design of wormhole-aware intrusion-tolerant protocols using a classical distributed systems problem: consensus. The system where the consensus protocol runs is mostly asynchronous and can fail in an arbitrary way, except for the wormhole, which is secure and synchronous. Using the wormhole to execute a few critical steps, the protocol manages to have a low time complexity: in the best case, it runs in a single round, even if some processes are malicious. The protocol is also arguably faster than classical Byzantine protocols, because it does not use public-key cryptography in runtime. The protocol has the interesting feature of not being bound by the FLP impossibility resultDepartment of Informatics, University of LisbonRepositório da Universidade de LisboaCorreia, MiguelNeves, Nuno FerreiraLung, Lau CheukVeríssimo, Paulo2009-02-10T13:11:45Z2003-082003-08-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/reportapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/14237porinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-08T15:59:55Zoai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/14237Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T21:36:03.633956Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Low Complexity Byzantine-Resilient Consensus |
title |
Low Complexity Byzantine-Resilient Consensus |
spellingShingle |
Low Complexity Byzantine-Resilient Consensus Correia, Miguel Byzantine fault tolerance intrusion tolerance distributed systems models distributed algorithms consensus |
title_short |
Low Complexity Byzantine-Resilient Consensus |
title_full |
Low Complexity Byzantine-Resilient Consensus |
title_fullStr |
Low Complexity Byzantine-Resilient Consensus |
title_full_unstemmed |
Low Complexity Byzantine-Resilient Consensus |
title_sort |
Low Complexity Byzantine-Resilient Consensus |
author |
Correia, Miguel |
author_facet |
Correia, Miguel Neves, Nuno Ferreira Lung, Lau Cheuk Veríssimo, Paulo |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Neves, Nuno Ferreira Lung, Lau Cheuk Veríssimo, Paulo |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Correia, Miguel Neves, Nuno Ferreira Lung, Lau Cheuk Veríssimo, Paulo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Byzantine fault tolerance intrusion tolerance distributed systems models distributed algorithms consensus |
topic |
Byzantine fault tolerance intrusion tolerance distributed systems models distributed algorithms consensus |
description |
The application of the tolerance paradigm to security intrusion tolerance has been raising a good deal of attention in the dependability and security communities. This paper is concerned with a novel approach to intrusion tolerance. The idea is to use privileged distributed components generically designated by wormholes to support the execution of intrusion-tolerant protocols, often called Byzantine-resilient protocols in the literature. The paper introduces the design of wormhole-aware intrusion-tolerant protocols using a classical distributed systems problem: consensus. The system where the consensus protocol runs is mostly asynchronous and can fail in an arbitrary way, except for the wormhole, which is secure and synchronous. Using the wormhole to execute a few critical steps, the protocol manages to have a low time complexity: in the best case, it runs in a single round, even if some processes are malicious. The protocol is also arguably faster than classical Byzantine protocols, because it does not use public-key cryptography in runtime. The protocol has the interesting feature of not being bound by the FLP impossibility result |
publishDate |
2003 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2003-08 2003-08-01T00:00:00Z 2009-02-10T13:11:45Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/report |
format |
report |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/14237 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10451/14237 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Department of Informatics, University of Lisbon |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Department of Informatics, University of Lisbon |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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