The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3888 |
Resumo: | In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank’s participation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme. Applying elements of a principal-agent analysis, this article analyses how the FCC ruling presents us with a new understanding of the relationship between the ECB, other EU institutions and Eurozone member states. Existing principal-agent analyses of the ECB focus upon its relations with other EU-level institutions and point to the limited ex ante control mechanisms and efforts to reinforce ex post control mechanisms—notably European Parliament oversight. The FCC ruling and the ECB’s reaction demonstrate the relative importance of national level controls over the ECB agent. This article understands the role of private plaintiffs in Germany as a form of ‘fire alarm’ on ECB policymaking against the background of weak ex post controls at the EU-level. |
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The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarmsaccountability; Bundesbank; Bundestag; Court of Justice of the European Union; European Central Bank; European Parliament; German Federal Constitutional Court; monetary policy; ordo-liberalism; principal-agent analysisIn May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank’s participation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme. Applying elements of a principal-agent analysis, this article analyses how the FCC ruling presents us with a new understanding of the relationship between the ECB, other EU institutions and Eurozone member states. Existing principal-agent analyses of the ECB focus upon its relations with other EU-level institutions and point to the limited ex ante control mechanisms and efforts to reinforce ex post control mechanisms—notably European Parliament oversight. The FCC ruling and the ECB’s reaction demonstrate the relative importance of national level controls over the ECB agent. This article understands the role of private plaintiffs in Germany as a form of ‘fire alarm’ on ECB policymaking against the background of weak ex post controls at the EU-level.Cogitatio2021-05-27info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3888oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/3888Politics and Governance; Vol 9, No 2 (2021): Reforming the Institutions of Eurozone Governance; 241-2512183-2463reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAPenghttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/3888https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3888https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/3888/3888Copyright (c) 2021 Clément Fontan, David Howarthhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFontan, ClémentHowarth, David2022-12-22T15:16:26Zoai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/3888Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:22:23.590371Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms |
title |
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms |
spellingShingle |
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms Fontan, Clément accountability; Bundesbank; Bundestag; Court of Justice of the European Union; European Central Bank; European Parliament; German Federal Constitutional Court; monetary policy; ordo-liberalism; principal-agent analysis |
title_short |
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms |
title_full |
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms |
title_fullStr |
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms |
title_full_unstemmed |
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms |
title_sort |
The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms |
author |
Fontan, Clément |
author_facet |
Fontan, Clément Howarth, David |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Howarth, David |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Fontan, Clément Howarth, David |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
accountability; Bundesbank; Bundestag; Court of Justice of the European Union; European Central Bank; European Parliament; German Federal Constitutional Court; monetary policy; ordo-liberalism; principal-agent analysis |
topic |
accountability; Bundesbank; Bundestag; Court of Justice of the European Union; European Central Bank; European Parliament; German Federal Constitutional Court; monetary policy; ordo-liberalism; principal-agent analysis |
description |
In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank’s participation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme. Applying elements of a principal-agent analysis, this article analyses how the FCC ruling presents us with a new understanding of the relationship between the ECB, other EU institutions and Eurozone member states. Existing principal-agent analyses of the ECB focus upon its relations with other EU-level institutions and point to the limited ex ante control mechanisms and efforts to reinforce ex post control mechanisms—notably European Parliament oversight. The FCC ruling and the ECB’s reaction demonstrate the relative importance of national level controls over the ECB agent. This article understands the role of private plaintiffs in Germany as a form of ‘fire alarm’ on ECB policymaking against the background of weak ex post controls at the EU-level. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-05-27 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3888 oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/3888 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3888 |
identifier_str_mv |
oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/3888 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/3888 https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3888 https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/3888/3888 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Clément Fontan, David Howarth http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Clément Fontan, David Howarth http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cogitatio |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cogitatio |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Politics and Governance; Vol 9, No 2 (2021): Reforming the Institutions of Eurozone Governance; 241-251 2183-2463 reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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1799130669581860864 |