War and peace: the european decolonization process

• Autor(a) principal: Garoupa, Nuno R.
• Data de Publicação: 2001
• Outros Autores: Gata, João E.
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22898
• topic: Colonialism; Decolonization; Colonial War; Colonizer's Rent; Extensive form Game; Perfect equilibium

Current historiography on the European decolonization processes has developed no general theory of these processes, but is rather a collection of case-based studies. Moreover, there is no consideration for counter-factual possibilities, including the analysis of those cases where independence has not occurred. In this paper we aim at constructing a rational theory approach to decolonization that can encompass the majority of historical cases. Our rational theory is constructed by considering the possible convergence, or divergence, of interests between central and local administrations, and the weight that each carries in the decolonization decision-making process. Our theory predicts that a high value colony will be more likely to experience a colonial war, whereas a low value colony is more likely to achieve independence in a peaceful manner. This observation has to be refined once we allow for the existence of a domestic game between hawks (pro-colonialism} and doves (pro-independence). We then study the strategic relations between the two players, native political organizations and the colonial power, and the domestic outcome.