Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI Model

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: José Martins
Data de Publicação: 2017
Outros Autores: Alberto Pinto
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/4973
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11538-017-0257-6
Resumo: We use the reinfection SIRI epidemiological model to analyze the impact of education programs and vaccine scares on individuals decisions to vaccinate or not. The presence of the reinfection provokes the novelty of the existence of three Nash equilibria for the same level of the morbidity relative risk instead of a single Nash equilibrium as occurs in the SIR model studied by Bauch and Earn (PNAS 101:13391-13394, 2004). The existence of three Nash equilibria, with two of them being evolutionary stable, introduces two scenarios with relevant and opposite features for the same level of the morbidity relative risk: the low-vaccination scenario corresponding to the evolutionary stable vaccination strategy, where individuals will vaccinate with a low probability; and the high-vaccination scenario corresponding to the evolutionary stable vaccination strategy, where individuals will vaccinate with a high probability. We introduce the evolutionary vaccination dynamics for the SIRI model and we prove that it is bistable. The bistability of the evolutionary dynamics indicates that the damage provoked by false scares on the vaccination perceived morbidity risks can be much higher and much more persistent than in the SIR model. Furthermore, the vaccination education programs to be efficient they need to implement a mechanism to suddenly increase the vaccination coverage level.
id RCAP_aa758f88a19f580e957fb9c68c4038f8
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.inesctec.pt:123456789/4973
network_acronym_str RCAP
network_name_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository_id_str 7160
spelling Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI ModelWe use the reinfection SIRI epidemiological model to analyze the impact of education programs and vaccine scares on individuals decisions to vaccinate or not. The presence of the reinfection provokes the novelty of the existence of three Nash equilibria for the same level of the morbidity relative risk instead of a single Nash equilibrium as occurs in the SIR model studied by Bauch and Earn (PNAS 101:13391-13394, 2004). The existence of three Nash equilibria, with two of them being evolutionary stable, introduces two scenarios with relevant and opposite features for the same level of the morbidity relative risk: the low-vaccination scenario corresponding to the evolutionary stable vaccination strategy, where individuals will vaccinate with a low probability; and the high-vaccination scenario corresponding to the evolutionary stable vaccination strategy, where individuals will vaccinate with a high probability. We introduce the evolutionary vaccination dynamics for the SIRI model and we prove that it is bistable. The bistability of the evolutionary dynamics indicates that the damage provoked by false scares on the vaccination perceived morbidity risks can be much higher and much more persistent than in the SIR model. Furthermore, the vaccination education programs to be efficient they need to implement a mechanism to suddenly increase the vaccination coverage level.2017-12-27T11:39:31Z2017-01-01T00:00:00Z2017info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/4973http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11538-017-0257-6engJosé MartinsAlberto Pintoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-10-12T02:21:04Zoai:repositorio.inesctec.pt:123456789/4973Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openairemluisa.alvim@gmail.comopendoar:71602024-10-12T02:21:04Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI Model
title Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI Model
spellingShingle Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI Model
José Martins
title_short Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI Model
title_full Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI Model
title_fullStr Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI Model
title_full_unstemmed Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI Model
title_sort Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SIRI Model
author José Martins
author_facet José Martins
Alberto Pinto
author_role author
author2 Alberto Pinto
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv José Martins
Alberto Pinto
description We use the reinfection SIRI epidemiological model to analyze the impact of education programs and vaccine scares on individuals decisions to vaccinate or not. The presence of the reinfection provokes the novelty of the existence of three Nash equilibria for the same level of the morbidity relative risk instead of a single Nash equilibrium as occurs in the SIR model studied by Bauch and Earn (PNAS 101:13391-13394, 2004). The existence of three Nash equilibria, with two of them being evolutionary stable, introduces two scenarios with relevant and opposite features for the same level of the morbidity relative risk: the low-vaccination scenario corresponding to the evolutionary stable vaccination strategy, where individuals will vaccinate with a low probability; and the high-vaccination scenario corresponding to the evolutionary stable vaccination strategy, where individuals will vaccinate with a high probability. We introduce the evolutionary vaccination dynamics for the SIRI model and we prove that it is bistable. The bistability of the evolutionary dynamics indicates that the damage provoked by false scares on the vaccination perceived morbidity risks can be much higher and much more persistent than in the SIR model. Furthermore, the vaccination education programs to be efficient they need to implement a mechanism to suddenly increase the vaccination coverage level.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-12-27T11:39:31Z
2017-01-01T00:00:00Z
2017
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/4973
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11538-017-0257-6
url http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/4973
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11538-017-0257-6
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mluisa.alvim@gmail.com
_version_ 1817548585351249920