Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vignolo, Massimiliano
Data de Publicação: 2015
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10451/24942
Resumo: Throughout his philosophical career, Michael Dummett held firmly two theses: (I) the theory of meaning has a central position in philosophy and all other forms of philosophical inquiry rest upon semantic analysis, in particular semantic issues replace traditional metaphysical issues; (II) the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. I will defend neither of them. However, I will argue that there is an important lesson we can learn by reflecting on the link between linguistic competence and semantics, which I take to be an important part of Dummett’s legacy in philosophy of language. I discuss this point in relation to Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism of Incompleteness Arguments.
id RCAP_add84c1d4f47329d5bd7ba2f594c7216
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/24942
network_acronym_str RCAP
network_name_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository_id_str 7160
spelling Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic CompetenceSemanticsPragmaticsMetaphysicsThroughout his philosophical career, Michael Dummett held firmly two theses: (I) the theory of meaning has a central position in philosophy and all other forms of philosophical inquiry rest upon semantic analysis, in particular semantic issues replace traditional metaphysical issues; (II) the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. I will defend neither of them. However, I will argue that there is an important lesson we can learn by reflecting on the link between linguistic competence and semantics, which I take to be an important part of Dummett’s legacy in philosophy of language. I discuss this point in relation to Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism of Incompleteness Arguments.Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de FilosofiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaVignolo, Massimiliano2016-11-02T10:10:46Z2015-112015-11-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/24942eng0873-626Xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-11-20T17:30:36Zoai:repositorio.ul.pt:10451/24942Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openairemluisa.alvim@gmail.comopendoar:71602024-11-20T17:30:36Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence
title Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence
spellingShingle Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence
Vignolo, Massimiliano
Semantics
Pragmatics
Metaphysics
title_short Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence
title_full Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence
title_fullStr Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence
title_full_unstemmed Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence
title_sort Dummett’s Legacy: Semantics, Metaphysics and Linguistic Competence
author Vignolo, Massimiliano
author_facet Vignolo, Massimiliano
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vignolo, Massimiliano
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Semantics
Pragmatics
Metaphysics
topic Semantics
Pragmatics
Metaphysics
description Throughout his philosophical career, Michael Dummett held firmly two theses: (I) the theory of meaning has a central position in philosophy and all other forms of philosophical inquiry rest upon semantic analysis, in particular semantic issues replace traditional metaphysical issues; (II) the theory of meaning is a theory of understanding. I will defend neither of them. However, I will argue that there is an important lesson we can learn by reflecting on the link between linguistic competence and semantics, which I take to be an important part of Dummett’s legacy in philosophy of language. I discuss this point in relation to Cappelen and Lepore’s criticism of Incompleteness Arguments.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-11
2015-11-01T00:00:00Z
2016-11-02T10:10:46Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10451/24942
url http://hdl.handle.net/10451/24942
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 0873-626X
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mluisa.alvim@gmail.com
_version_ 1817548913390911488

Registros relacionados