Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pina, Álvaro M.
Data de Publicação: 2000
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22740
Resumo: This paper studies the impact of partisan national fiscal policy on the optimal central bank design of a two-country monetary union. In each country two parties with different preferences compete for office, their succession in power being formalized as zero-mean political shocks. These contrast with supply disturbances both because political shocks call for more, rather than less, central bank conservatism and insofar as cross-country shock asymmetry is actually beneficial to welfare. Further, by combining Rogoff-type 'weight-conservatism' with an inflation target it is possible to ensure that monetary delegation always benefits both parties
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spelling Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfarePolitical CyclesMonetary UnionCentral Bank IndependenceAsymmetric ShocksThis paper studies the impact of partisan national fiscal policy on the optimal central bank design of a two-country monetary union. In each country two parties with different preferences compete for office, their succession in power being formalized as zero-mean political shocks. These contrast with supply disturbances both because political shocks call for more, rather than less, central bank conservatism and insofar as cross-country shock asymmetry is actually beneficial to welfare. Further, by combining Rogoff-type 'weight-conservatism' with an inflation target it is possible to ensure that monetary delegation always benefits both partiesISEG - Departamento de EconomiaRepositório da Universidade de LisboaPina, Álvaro M.2021-12-16T09:37:13Z20002000-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22740engPina, Álvaro M.. 2000. " Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 10-2000/DE0874-4548info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:52:17Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/22740Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:07:05.208609Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare
title Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare
spellingShingle Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare
Pina, Álvaro M.
Political Cycles
Monetary Union
Central Bank Independence
Asymmetric Shocks
title_short Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare
title_full Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare
title_fullStr Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare
title_full_unstemmed Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare
title_sort Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare
author Pina, Álvaro M.
author_facet Pina, Álvaro M.
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pina, Álvaro M.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Political Cycles
Monetary Union
Central Bank Independence
Asymmetric Shocks
topic Political Cycles
Monetary Union
Central Bank Independence
Asymmetric Shocks
description This paper studies the impact of partisan national fiscal policy on the optimal central bank design of a two-country monetary union. In each country two parties with different preferences compete for office, their succession in power being formalized as zero-mean political shocks. These contrast with supply disturbances both because political shocks call for more, rather than less, central bank conservatism and insofar as cross-country shock asymmetry is actually beneficial to welfare. Further, by combining Rogoff-type 'weight-conservatism' with an inflation target it is possible to ensure that monetary delegation always benefits both parties
publishDate 2000
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2000
2000-01-01T00:00:00Z
2021-12-16T09:37:13Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22740
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22740
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Pina, Álvaro M.. 2000. " Partisan fiscal policy in a monetary union : asymmetric shocks, delegation and welfare". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 10-2000/DE
0874-4548
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv ISEG - Departamento de Economia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv ISEG - Departamento de Economia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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