I like the way you move: tax competition in Portuguese Municipal corporate income tax

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Lopes, Marta C.
Data de Publicação: 2015
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/30143
Resumo: We study tax competition in municipal corporate income tax using a di erence-indi erences approach based on the fact that municipalities with a left-wing mayor set consistently higher tax rates than those with a right-wing mayor. We use a panel of 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities, between 1998 and 2013. We show that leftrun municipalities with a common border with one or more right-run municipalities (the treatment group) set lower tax rates than the remaining left-run municipalities (the control group). We also show that this lower tax rate does not result from a smaller left-leaning preference of the voters of treated municipalities. We build on this di erence-in-di erences approach to provide an instrumental variables estimation of the municipal tax reaction functions. Our preferred estimate suggests that municipalities react to an average increase of 1 pp of the neighbours' tax rate with an own tax increase of 0.884 pp. We show that the strategic interaction is invariant to the political strength of the incumbent mayor, which we take as evidence that tax, rather than yardstick competition, is driving our results.
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spelling I like the way you move: tax competition in Portuguese Municipal corporate income taxTax competitionLocal taxationCorporate income taxPortugal JEL classifcation: D72, H71, H73Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e GestãoWe study tax competition in municipal corporate income tax using a di erence-indi erences approach based on the fact that municipalities with a left-wing mayor set consistently higher tax rates than those with a right-wing mayor. We use a panel of 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities, between 1998 and 2013. We show that leftrun municipalities with a common border with one or more right-run municipalities (the treatment group) set lower tax rates than the remaining left-run municipalities (the control group). We also show that this lower tax rate does not result from a smaller left-leaning preference of the voters of treated municipalities. We build on this di erence-in-di erences approach to provide an instrumental variables estimation of the municipal tax reaction functions. Our preferred estimate suggests that municipalities react to an average increase of 1 pp of the neighbours' tax rate with an own tax increase of 0.884 pp. We show that the strategic interaction is invariant to the political strength of the incumbent mayor, which we take as evidence that tax, rather than yardstick competition, is driving our results.Peralta, SusanaRUNLopes, Marta C.2022-07-30T00:30:40Z2015-07-062015-07-06T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/30143TID:201474808enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:16:37Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/30143Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:29:25.030122Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv I like the way you move: tax competition in Portuguese Municipal corporate income tax
title I like the way you move: tax competition in Portuguese Municipal corporate income tax
spellingShingle I like the way you move: tax competition in Portuguese Municipal corporate income tax
Lopes, Marta C.
Tax competition
Local taxation
Corporate income tax
Portugal JEL classifcation: D72, H71, H73
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
title_short I like the way you move: tax competition in Portuguese Municipal corporate income tax
title_full I like the way you move: tax competition in Portuguese Municipal corporate income tax
title_fullStr I like the way you move: tax competition in Portuguese Municipal corporate income tax
title_full_unstemmed I like the way you move: tax competition in Portuguese Municipal corporate income tax
title_sort I like the way you move: tax competition in Portuguese Municipal corporate income tax
author Lopes, Marta C.
author_facet Lopes, Marta C.
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Peralta, Susana
RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Lopes, Marta C.
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Tax competition
Local taxation
Corporate income tax
Portugal JEL classifcation: D72, H71, H73
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
topic Tax competition
Local taxation
Corporate income tax
Portugal JEL classifcation: D72, H71, H73
Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
description We study tax competition in municipal corporate income tax using a di erence-indi erences approach based on the fact that municipalities with a left-wing mayor set consistently higher tax rates than those with a right-wing mayor. We use a panel of 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities, between 1998 and 2013. We show that leftrun municipalities with a common border with one or more right-run municipalities (the treatment group) set lower tax rates than the remaining left-run municipalities (the control group). We also show that this lower tax rate does not result from a smaller left-leaning preference of the voters of treated municipalities. We build on this di erence-in-di erences approach to provide an instrumental variables estimation of the municipal tax reaction functions. Our preferred estimate suggests that municipalities react to an average increase of 1 pp of the neighbours' tax rate with an own tax increase of 0.884 pp. We show that the strategic interaction is invariant to the political strength of the incumbent mayor, which we take as evidence that tax, rather than yardstick competition, is driving our results.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-07-06
2015-07-06T00:00:00Z
2022-07-30T00:30:40Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
format masterThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/30143
TID:201474808
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/30143
identifier_str_mv TID:201474808
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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