Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Schneider, Stephen
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10071/5396
Resumo: This article tests two inter-related theories on the situational causes of violence in illicit drug markets: (i) drug markets that are unstable are more prone to violence and (ii) there is a higher risk of instability, and hence conflict and violence, in drug markets characterized by pure competition. These theories are applied to the violence that occurred between the Hell’s Angels and its rivals over dominance in Quebec’s lucrative cocaine market during the 1990s. The theory that violence stems from instability in an illicit market is applicable to this case study. However, Quebec’s cocaine market was characterized by oligopolistic conditions and the ensuing violence stemmed from the Hell’s Angels’ efforts to maintain hegemony in that market. This paper argues that oligopolistic and monopolistic conditions in illicit drug markets may heighten the risk of conflict and violence because such conditions inhibit competition.
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spelling Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case studyOrganized crimeIllicit marketsViolenceCrime organizadoMercados ilícitosViolênciaOrganized crimeIllicit marketsViolenceCrimen organizadoMercados ilícitosViolenciaThis article tests two inter-related theories on the situational causes of violence in illicit drug markets: (i) drug markets that are unstable are more prone to violence and (ii) there is a higher risk of instability, and hence conflict and violence, in drug markets characterized by pure competition. These theories are applied to the violence that occurred between the Hell’s Angels and its rivals over dominance in Quebec’s lucrative cocaine market during the 1990s. The theory that violence stems from instability in an illicit market is applicable to this case study. However, Quebec’s cocaine market was characterized by oligopolistic conditions and the ensuing violence stemmed from the Hell’s Angels’ efforts to maintain hegemony in that market. This paper argues that oligopolistic and monopolistic conditions in illicit drug markets may heighten the risk of conflict and violence because such conditions inhibit competition.Este artigo testa duas teorias inter-relacionadas sobre as causas situacionais de violência nos mercados de drogas ilícitas: (i) os mercados de drogas que são instáveis são mais propensos à violência e (ii) existe um maior risco de instabilidade e, portanto, de conflito e violência, em mercados de drogas caracterizados por pura concorrência. Estas teorias aplicam-se à violência que ocorreu entre os Hell’s Angels e os seus rivais pela posição dominante no mercado lucrativo de cocaína no Quebec durante a década de 1990. A teoria de que a violência decorre da instabilidade num mercado ilícito é aplicável a este estudo de caso. No entanto, o mercado de cocaína no Quebec foi caracterizado por condições oligopolísticas e a violência que se seguiu resultou dos esforços dos Hell’s Angels para manterem a hegemonia no mercado. Este artigo argumenta que as condições de oligopólio e monopólio em mercados de drogas ilícitas podem aumentar o risco de conflito e violência, porque inibem a concorrência.This article tests two inter-related theories on the situational causes of violence in illicit drug markets: (i) drug markets that are unstable are more prone to violence and (ii) there is a higher risk of instability, and hence conflict and violence, in drug markets characterized by pure competition. These theories are applied to the violence that occurred between the Hell’s Angels and its rivals over dominance in Quebec’s lucrative cocaine market during the 1990s. The theory that violence stems from instability in an illicit market is applicable to this case study. However, Quebec’s cocaine market was characterized by oligopolistic conditions and the ensuing violence stemmed from the Hell’s Angels’ efforts to maintain hegemony in that market. This paper argues that oligopolistic and monopolistic conditions in illicit drug markets may heighten the risk of conflict and violence because such conditions inhibit competition.Este artículo prueba dos teorías inter-relacionadas sobre las causas situacionales de violencia en los mercados de drogas ilícitas: (i) los mercados de drogas que son inestables son más propensos a la violencia y (ii) existe un mayor riesgo de instabilidad, y, por lo tanto, de conflicto y violencia, en mercados de drogas caracterizados por pura competencia. Estas teorías se aplican a la violencia que ocurrió entre los Hell’s Angels y sus rivales por la posición dominante en el mercado lucrativo de cocaína en Quebec durante la década de 1990. La teoría de que la violencia resulta de la instabilidad en un mercado ilícito es aplicable a este estudio de caso. Sin embargo, el mercado de cocaína en Quebec fue caracterizado por condiciones oligopolistas y la violencia consecuente de los esfuerzos de los Hell’s Angels para mantener la hegemonía en el mercado. Este artículo argumenta que las condiciones oligopolistas y monopolistas en mercados de drogas ilícitas pueden aumentar el riesgo de conflicto y violencia, porque tales condiciones inhiben la competencia.Mundos Sociais/CIES-IUL2013-08-07T11:08:07Z2013-01-01T00:00:00Z2013-01info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10071/5396eng0873-6529Schneider, Stepheninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-09T17:26:29Zoai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/5396Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:11:51.615050Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study
title Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study
spellingShingle Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study
Schneider, Stephen
Organized crime
Illicit markets
Violence
Crime organizado
Mercados ilícitos
Violência
Organized crime
Illicit markets
Violence
Crimen organizado
Mercados ilícitos
Violencia
title_short Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study
title_full Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study
title_fullStr Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study
title_full_unstemmed Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study
title_sort Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study
author Schneider, Stephen
author_facet Schneider, Stephen
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Schneider, Stephen
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Organized crime
Illicit markets
Violence
Crime organizado
Mercados ilícitos
Violência
Organized crime
Illicit markets
Violence
Crimen organizado
Mercados ilícitos
Violencia
topic Organized crime
Illicit markets
Violence
Crime organizado
Mercados ilícitos
Violência
Organized crime
Illicit markets
Violence
Crimen organizado
Mercados ilícitos
Violencia
description This article tests two inter-related theories on the situational causes of violence in illicit drug markets: (i) drug markets that are unstable are more prone to violence and (ii) there is a higher risk of instability, and hence conflict and violence, in drug markets characterized by pure competition. These theories are applied to the violence that occurred between the Hell’s Angels and its rivals over dominance in Quebec’s lucrative cocaine market during the 1990s. The theory that violence stems from instability in an illicit market is applicable to this case study. However, Quebec’s cocaine market was characterized by oligopolistic conditions and the ensuing violence stemmed from the Hell’s Angels’ efforts to maintain hegemony in that market. This paper argues that oligopolistic and monopolistic conditions in illicit drug markets may heighten the risk of conflict and violence because such conditions inhibit competition.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-08-07T11:08:07Z
2013-01-01T00:00:00Z
2013-01
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