Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/1822/72790 |
Resumo: | While the benefits of common and public goods are shared, they tend to be scarce when contributions are provided voluntarily. Failure to cooperate in the provision or preservation of these goods is fundamental to sustainability challenges, ranging from local fisheries to global climate change. In the real world, such cooperative dilemmas occur in multiple interactions with complex strategic interests and frequently without full information. We argue that voluntary cooperation enabled across overlapping coalitions (akin to polycentricity) not only facilitates a higher generation of non-excludable public goods, but it may also allow evolution toward a more cooperative, stable, and inclusive approach to governance. Contrary to any previous study, we show that these merits of multi-coalition governance are far more general than the singular examples occurring in the literature, and they are robust under diverse conditions of excludability, congestion of the non-excludable public good, and arbitrary shapes of the return-to-contribution function. We first confirm the intuition that a single coalition without enforcement and with players pursuing their self-interest without knowledge of returns to contribution is prone to cooperative failure. Next, we demonstrate that the same pessimistic model but with a multi-coalition structure of governance experiences relatively higher cooperation by enabling recognition of marginal gains of cooperation in the game at stake. In the absence of enforcement, public-goods regimes that evolve through a proliferation of voluntary cooperative forums can maintain and increase cooperation more successfully than singular, inclusive regimes. |
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Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goodsCiências Naturais::Ciências BiológicasScience & TechnologyWhile the benefits of common and public goods are shared, they tend to be scarce when contributions are provided voluntarily. Failure to cooperate in the provision or preservation of these goods is fundamental to sustainability challenges, ranging from local fisheries to global climate change. In the real world, such cooperative dilemmas occur in multiple interactions with complex strategic interests and frequently without full information. We argue that voluntary cooperation enabled across overlapping coalitions (akin to polycentricity) not only facilitates a higher generation of non-excludable public goods, but it may also allow evolution toward a more cooperative, stable, and inclusive approach to governance. Contrary to any previous study, we show that these merits of multi-coalition governance are far more general than the singular examples occurring in the literature, and they are robust under diverse conditions of excludability, congestion of the non-excludable public good, and arbitrary shapes of the return-to-contribution function. We first confirm the intuition that a single coalition without enforcement and with players pursuing their self-interest without knowledge of returns to contribution is prone to cooperative failure. Next, we demonstrate that the same pessimistic model but with a multi-coalition structure of governance experiences relatively higher cooperation by enabling recognition of marginal gains of cooperation in the game at stake. In the absence of enforcement, public-goods regimes that evolve through a proliferation of voluntary cooperative forums can maintain and increase cooperation more successfully than singular, inclusive regimes.Supported by US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (D17AC00005), National Science Foundation grant GEO-1211972, and Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT) through grants PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014, PTDC/EEI-SII/5081/2014, and UID/BIA/04050/2013. P.M.H. was supported by the Walbridge Fund at the Princeton Environmental Institute.Nature ResearchUniversidade do MinhoVasconcelos, Vitor V.Hannam, Phillip M.Levin, Simon A.Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos20202020-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/72790engVasconcelos, V.V., Hannam, P.M., Levin, S.A. et al. Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods. Sci Rep 10, 9194 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-65960-82045-232210.1038/s41598-020-65960-832514093https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-65960-8info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:10:33Zoai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/72790Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T19:02:12.641993Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods |
title |
Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods |
spellingShingle |
Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods Vasconcelos, Vitor V. Ciências Naturais::Ciências Biológicas Science & Technology |
title_short |
Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods |
title_full |
Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods |
title_fullStr |
Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods |
title_full_unstemmed |
Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods |
title_sort |
Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods |
author |
Vasconcelos, Vitor V. |
author_facet |
Vasconcelos, Vitor V. Hannam, Phillip M. Levin, Simon A. Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Hannam, Phillip M. Levin, Simon A. Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vasconcelos, Vitor V. Hannam, Phillip M. Levin, Simon A. Pacheco, Jorge Manuel Santos |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Ciências Naturais::Ciências Biológicas Science & Technology |
topic |
Ciências Naturais::Ciências Biológicas Science & Technology |
description |
While the benefits of common and public goods are shared, they tend to be scarce when contributions are provided voluntarily. Failure to cooperate in the provision or preservation of these goods is fundamental to sustainability challenges, ranging from local fisheries to global climate change. In the real world, such cooperative dilemmas occur in multiple interactions with complex strategic interests and frequently without full information. We argue that voluntary cooperation enabled across overlapping coalitions (akin to polycentricity) not only facilitates a higher generation of non-excludable public goods, but it may also allow evolution toward a more cooperative, stable, and inclusive approach to governance. Contrary to any previous study, we show that these merits of multi-coalition governance are far more general than the singular examples occurring in the literature, and they are robust under diverse conditions of excludability, congestion of the non-excludable public good, and arbitrary shapes of the return-to-contribution function. We first confirm the intuition that a single coalition without enforcement and with players pursuing their self-interest without knowledge of returns to contribution is prone to cooperative failure. Next, we demonstrate that the same pessimistic model but with a multi-coalition structure of governance experiences relatively higher cooperation by enabling recognition of marginal gains of cooperation in the game at stake. In the absence of enforcement, public-goods regimes that evolve through a proliferation of voluntary cooperative forums can maintain and increase cooperation more successfully than singular, inclusive regimes. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/72790 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/72790 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Vasconcelos, V.V., Hannam, P.M., Levin, S.A. et al. Coalition-structured governance improves cooperation to provide public goods. Sci Rep 10, 9194 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-65960-8 2045-2322 10.1038/s41598-020-65960-8 32514093 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-65960-8 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nature Research |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nature Research |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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