Free cash flow and investment precommitment
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2000 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/9921 |
Resumo: | Theories of high leverage based on the argument that debt repayment forces management to disgorge free cash flow ignore the fact that firms' investment decisions often affect the investment decisions of competitors. This paper shows that when firms interact through their investment decisions, free cash flow in the hands of an investment-prone manager can serve as a strategic weapon. Endowing management with free cash flow precommits the firm to large, predatory investments, which keep rivals away from common investment opportunities. The focus on the precommitment value of free cash flow leads to a number of implications on cross-firm effects that are broadly consistent with existing evidence. |
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Free cash flow and investment precommitmentTheories of high leverage based on the argument that debt repayment forces management to disgorge free cash flow ignore the fact that firms' investment decisions often affect the investment decisions of competitors. This paper shows that when firms interact through their investment decisions, free cash flow in the hands of an investment-prone manager can serve as a strategic weapon. Endowing management with free cash flow precommits the firm to large, predatory investments, which keep rivals away from common investment opportunities. The focus on the precommitment value of free cash flow leads to a number of implications on cross-firm effects that are broadly consistent with existing evidence.Instituto Superior de Economia e GestãoRepositório da Universidade de LisboaGuedes, José Filipe Corrêa2015-10-28T14:23:40Z20002000-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/9921engGuedes, José Filipe Corrêa (2000). "Free cash flow and investment precommitment". Estudos de Gestão, V(1):3-22info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:40:19Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/9921Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:56:30.047477Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Free cash flow and investment precommitment |
title |
Free cash flow and investment precommitment |
spellingShingle |
Free cash flow and investment precommitment Guedes, José Filipe Corrêa |
title_short |
Free cash flow and investment precommitment |
title_full |
Free cash flow and investment precommitment |
title_fullStr |
Free cash flow and investment precommitment |
title_full_unstemmed |
Free cash flow and investment precommitment |
title_sort |
Free cash flow and investment precommitment |
author |
Guedes, José Filipe Corrêa |
author_facet |
Guedes, José Filipe Corrêa |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Guedes, José Filipe Corrêa |
description |
Theories of high leverage based on the argument that debt repayment forces management to disgorge free cash flow ignore the fact that firms' investment decisions often affect the investment decisions of competitors. This paper shows that when firms interact through their investment decisions, free cash flow in the hands of an investment-prone manager can serve as a strategic weapon. Endowing management with free cash flow precommits the firm to large, predatory investments, which keep rivals away from common investment opportunities. The focus on the precommitment value of free cash flow leads to a number of implications on cross-firm effects that are broadly consistent with existing evidence. |
publishDate |
2000 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2000 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z 2015-10-28T14:23:40Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/9921 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/9921 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Guedes, José Filipe Corrêa (2000). "Free cash flow and investment precommitment". Estudos de Gestão, V(1):3-22 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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