Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vareda, João
Data de Publicação: 2007
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/88074
Resumo: We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant's decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be distorted (lower or higher) as compared to first best. Still, this is better than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may help to achieve the first best.
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spelling Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about DemandAccess PricingAsymetric InformationSignalingRevelation principleWe study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant's decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be distorted (lower or higher) as compared to first best. Still, this is better than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may help to achieve the first best.Nova SBERUNVareda, João2019-11-22T16:27:24Z2007-112007-11-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/88074engVareda, João, Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand (November, 2007). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 525info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:39:16Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/88074Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:49.978183Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand
title Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand
spellingShingle Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand
Vareda, João
Access Pricing
Asymetric Information
Signaling
Revelation principle
title_short Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand
title_full Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand
title_fullStr Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand
title_full_unstemmed Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand
title_sort Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand
author Vareda, João
author_facet Vareda, João
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vareda, João
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Access Pricing
Asymetric Information
Signaling
Revelation principle
topic Access Pricing
Asymetric Information
Signaling
Revelation principle
description We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant's decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be distorted (lower or higher) as compared to first best. Still, this is better than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may help to achieve the first best.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007-11
2007-11-01T00:00:00Z
2019-11-22T16:27:24Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/88074
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/88074
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Vareda, João, Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand (November, 2007). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 525
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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