Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Donnelly, Shawn
Data de Publicação: 2023
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7250
Resumo: This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending that would otherwise have been rejected), and carve-outs (exemptions to federal spending programmes to buy off objecting veto players) to secure political support for national-level programmes, and asks under what conditions those limits might be breached. We look at the EU, Canada, and the US. These tactics are most successful at “getting to yes” for federal authorities when they can isolate individual objections. As long as those objections persist, the limits will persist as well.
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spelling Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powersbudget politics; Canada; European Union; fiscal federalism; political economy; redistribution; state‐building; United StatesThis article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending that would otherwise have been rejected), and carve-outs (exemptions to federal spending programmes to buy off objecting veto players) to secure political support for national-level programmes, and asks under what conditions those limits might be breached. We look at the EU, Canada, and the US. These tactics are most successful at “getting to yes” for federal authorities when they can isolate individual objections. As long as those objections persist, the limits will persist as well.Cogitatio Press2023-10-27info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7250https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7250Politics and Governance; Vol 11, No 4 (2023): Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post-Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power; 92-1012183-246310.17645/pag.i373reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAPenghttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/7250https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/7250/3483Copyright (c) 2023 Shawn Donnellyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDonnelly, Shawn2023-11-23T15:15:21Zoai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/7250Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T21:26:32.732101Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers
title Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers
spellingShingle Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers
Donnelly, Shawn
budget politics; Canada; European Union; fiscal federalism; political economy; redistribution; state‐building; United States
title_short Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers
title_full Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers
title_fullStr Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers
title_full_unstemmed Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers
title_sort Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers
author Donnelly, Shawn
author_facet Donnelly, Shawn
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Donnelly, Shawn
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv budget politics; Canada; European Union; fiscal federalism; political economy; redistribution; state‐building; United States
topic budget politics; Canada; European Union; fiscal federalism; political economy; redistribution; state‐building; United States
description This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have-nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits), caps, compartments (special justification for spending that would otherwise have been rejected), and carve-outs (exemptions to federal spending programmes to buy off objecting veto players) to secure political support for national-level programmes, and asks under what conditions those limits might be breached. We look at the EU, Canada, and the US. These tactics are most successful at “getting to yes” for federal authorities when they can isolate individual objections. As long as those objections persist, the limits will persist as well.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-10-27
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7250
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7250
url https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i4.7250
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/7250
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/7250/3483
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Shawn Donnelly
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Shawn Donnelly
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cogitatio Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cogitatio Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Politics and Governance; Vol 11, No 4 (2023): Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post-Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power; 92-101
2183-2463
10.17645/pag.i373
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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