Why voters do not throw the rascals out?- A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://ciencia.iscte-iul.pt/public/pub/id/16620 http://hdl.handle.net/10071/7426 |
Resumo: | One of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductory article, we try to develop a multidimensional framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. First, we will look into various studies on electoral punishment and highlight their advancements and shortcomings. Then, we will propose a more dynamic account of electoral punishment of corruption that takes into account individual as well as macro level explanations. Finally, we will disaggregate these two analytical dimensions into various explanatory factors. |
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Why voters do not throw the rascals out?- A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruptionPolitical CorruptionVoting-BehaviorCongressional ElectionsDemocraciesImpactPerceptionsGovernmentTrustAccountabilityClientelismOne of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductory article, we try to develop a multidimensional framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. First, we will look into various studies on electoral punishment and highlight their advancements and shortcomings. Then, we will propose a more dynamic account of electoral punishment of corruption that takes into account individual as well as macro level explanations. Finally, we will disaggregate these two analytical dimensions into various explanatory factors.Springer Verlag2014-06-03T16:28:05Z2013-12-01T00:00:00Z2013-122014-06-03T16:24:49Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://ciencia.iscte-iul.pt/public/pub/id/16620http://hdl.handle.net/10071/7426eng0925-4994Sousa, L.Bezerra, M.info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-09T17:41:41Zoai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/7426Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:19:25.438531Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Why voters do not throw the rascals out?- A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption |
title |
Why voters do not throw the rascals out?- A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption |
spellingShingle |
Why voters do not throw the rascals out?- A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption Sousa, L. Political Corruption Voting-Behavior Congressional Elections Democracies Impact Perceptions Government Trust Accountability Clientelism |
title_short |
Why voters do not throw the rascals out?- A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption |
title_full |
Why voters do not throw the rascals out?- A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption |
title_fullStr |
Why voters do not throw the rascals out?- A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption |
title_full_unstemmed |
Why voters do not throw the rascals out?- A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption |
title_sort |
Why voters do not throw the rascals out?- A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption |
author |
Sousa, L. |
author_facet |
Sousa, L. Bezerra, M. |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Bezerra, M. |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Sousa, L. Bezerra, M. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Political Corruption Voting-Behavior Congressional Elections Democracies Impact Perceptions Government Trust Accountability Clientelism |
topic |
Political Corruption Voting-Behavior Congressional Elections Democracies Impact Perceptions Government Trust Accountability Clientelism |
description |
One of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductory article, we try to develop a multidimensional framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. First, we will look into various studies on electoral punishment and highlight their advancements and shortcomings. Then, we will propose a more dynamic account of electoral punishment of corruption that takes into account individual as well as macro level explanations. Finally, we will disaggregate these two analytical dimensions into various explanatory factors. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-12-01T00:00:00Z 2013-12 2014-06-03T16:28:05Z 2014-06-03T16:24:49Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://ciencia.iscte-iul.pt/public/pub/id/16620 http://hdl.handle.net/10071/7426 |
url |
https://ciencia.iscte-iul.pt/public/pub/id/16620 http://hdl.handle.net/10071/7426 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
0925-4994 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
embargoedAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer Verlag |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Springer Verlag |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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