Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2007 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82954 |
Resumo: | I analyze a simple model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. I show that contractual signalling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible. This is because contracted quantity encourages investment in the relationship but also signals information. This conflict generates inefficient equilibria in terms of investment. Contracting on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the conflict (and consequently eliminates the inefficiency of investment) when the asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. While exclusivity also signals information, unlike quantity it does not directly affect relationship-speciffic investment. |
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Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive AgreementsRelationship-specific investmentAsymmetric informationHold-upExclusivityI analyze a simple model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. I show that contractual signalling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible. This is because contracted quantity encourages investment in the relationship but also signals information. This conflict generates inefficient equilibria in terms of investment. Contracting on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the conflict (and consequently eliminates the inefficiency of investment) when the asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. While exclusivity also signals information, unlike quantity it does not directly affect relationship-speciffic investment.Nova SBERUNVasconcelos, Luis2019-10-02T09:42:59Z2007-122007-12-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/82954engVasconcelos, Luis, Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements (December, 2007). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 495info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:36:52Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/82954Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:14.534199Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements |
title |
Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements |
spellingShingle |
Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements Vasconcelos, Luis Relationship-specific investment Asymmetric information Hold-up Exclusivity |
title_short |
Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements |
title_full |
Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements |
title_fullStr |
Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements |
title_full_unstemmed |
Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements |
title_sort |
Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements |
author |
Vasconcelos, Luis |
author_facet |
Vasconcelos, Luis |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vasconcelos, Luis |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Relationship-specific investment Asymmetric information Hold-up Exclusivity |
topic |
Relationship-specific investment Asymmetric information Hold-up Exclusivity |
description |
I analyze a simple model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. I show that contractual signalling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible. This is because contracted quantity encourages investment in the relationship but also signals information. This conflict generates inefficient equilibria in terms of investment. Contracting on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the conflict (and consequently eliminates the inefficiency of investment) when the asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. While exclusivity also signals information, unlike quantity it does not directly affect relationship-speciffic investment. |
publishDate |
2007 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2007-12 2007-12-01T00:00:00Z 2019-10-02T09:42:59Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82954 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/82954 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Vasconcelos, Luis, Contractual Signalling, Relationship-Specific Investment and Exclusive Agreements (December, 2007). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 495 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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