Adaptive deterrence sanctions in a normative framework

• Autor(a) principal: Herique Lopes Cardoso
• Data de Publicação: 2009
• Outros Autores: Eugénio Oliveira
• Tipo de documento: Livro
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
• Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/10216/15130
• topic: Ciências da computação e da informação; Computer and information sciences

Normative environments are used to regulate multi-agent interactions. In business encounters, agents representing business entities make contracts including norms that prescribe what agents should do. Agent autonomy, however, gives agents the ability to decide whether they fulfill or violate their commitments. In this paper we present an adaptive mechanism that enables a normative framework to change deterrence sanctions according to an agent population, in order to preclude agents from exploiting potential normative flaws. The system tries to avoid institutional control beyond what is strictly necessary, seeking to maximize agent contracting activity while ensuring a certain commitment compliance level, when agents have unknown risk and social attitudes.