Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Outros Autores: | , , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/5908 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2017.1388235 |
Resumo: | The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model. |
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Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruptionThe aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model.2018-01-11T15:31:23Z2017-01-01T00:00:00Z2017info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/5908http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2017.1388235engElvio AccinelliLuís Filipe MartinsOviedo,JAlberto PintoQuintas,Linfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-05-15T10:20:14Zoai:repositorio.inesctec.pt:123456789/5908Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:52:52.132170Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption |
title |
Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption |
spellingShingle |
Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption Elvio Accinelli |
title_short |
Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption |
title_full |
Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption |
title_fullStr |
Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption |
title_full_unstemmed |
Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption |
title_sort |
Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption |
author |
Elvio Accinelli |
author_facet |
Elvio Accinelli Luís Filipe Martins Oviedo,J Alberto Pinto Quintas,L |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Luís Filipe Martins Oviedo,J Alberto Pinto Quintas,L |
author2_role |
author author author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Elvio Accinelli Luís Filipe Martins Oviedo,J Alberto Pinto Quintas,L |
description |
The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-01-01T00:00:00Z 2017 2018-01-11T15:31:23Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/5908 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2017.1388235 |
url |
http://repositorio.inesctec.pt/handle/123456789/5908 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2017.1388235 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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