O que queremos do estado? As limitações das abordagens atuais
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2015 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://doi.org/10.34632/gaudiumsciendi.2015.2766 |
Resumo: | Robert Nozick finishes Anarchy, State and Utopia with the idea of a utopia where a minimal state would allow the social organization of the most different ways of life. Even if the framework is libertarian, the individual communities could reject laissez-faire market transactions or liberal democracy. Different people have different desires and some would valorize security instead of liberty, or socialism instead of capitalism. Nozick holds that the minimal state, as a framework for utopia, is an inspiring view because it guarantees that the individuals' rights would remain inviolable, allowing them to choose freely what they want to do with their lives. Should this libertarian idea be exported to the organization of different communities? Or does a larger state have some kind of importance to preserve its members' rights? Also, is it possible to understand political liberalism without the state? This is the starting point for our reflection on the role of the state in ensuring pluralism and liberty among individuals and groups. One common assumption is that pluralism or liberalism is incompatible with “perfectionism” i.e. that the state avoiding to support any particular conception of the good life is the only or the best guarantee of liberalism. Tolerance for different ways of grasping the truth or the respect for the lights in others minds is not enough but the liberal State must be grounded in the absence of any belief or truth in both the moral and political realms. Max Weber’s sociological work long ago defined the modern state as necessarily coercive. It was defined by the monopoly of violence inside a country. Even now his definition of the state is widely shared among sociologists and political theorists. But Max Weber’s conception also carried, or went hand-in-hand with the threat of relativism, and fell victim to or was inspired by an epistemological conception that ends with equal treatment for both good and bad people. In this paper we intend to explore the connection between truth and politics and return to a more ancient alternative account of the legitimacy of coercion that goes back to Aristotle’s idea of the polis as a collective venture, and question its applicability to the modern world. Our main contention is that the polis’s purpose to provide for human excellence and not just as an arena offering political protection to free market capitalists should not be lightly discarded. |
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O que queremos do estado? As limitações das abordagens atuaisRobert Nozick finishes Anarchy, State and Utopia with the idea of a utopia where a minimal state would allow the social organization of the most different ways of life. Even if the framework is libertarian, the individual communities could reject laissez-faire market transactions or liberal democracy. Different people have different desires and some would valorize security instead of liberty, or socialism instead of capitalism. Nozick holds that the minimal state, as a framework for utopia, is an inspiring view because it guarantees that the individuals' rights would remain inviolable, allowing them to choose freely what they want to do with their lives. Should this libertarian idea be exported to the organization of different communities? Or does a larger state have some kind of importance to preserve its members' rights? Also, is it possible to understand political liberalism without the state? This is the starting point for our reflection on the role of the state in ensuring pluralism and liberty among individuals and groups. One common assumption is that pluralism or liberalism is incompatible with “perfectionism” i.e. that the state avoiding to support any particular conception of the good life is the only or the best guarantee of liberalism. Tolerance for different ways of grasping the truth or the respect for the lights in others minds is not enough but the liberal State must be grounded in the absence of any belief or truth in both the moral and political realms. Max Weber’s sociological work long ago defined the modern state as necessarily coercive. It was defined by the monopoly of violence inside a country. Even now his definition of the state is widely shared among sociologists and political theorists. But Max Weber’s conception also carried, or went hand-in-hand with the threat of relativism, and fell victim to or was inspired by an epistemological conception that ends with equal treatment for both good and bad people. In this paper we intend to explore the connection between truth and politics and return to a more ancient alternative account of the legitimacy of coercion that goes back to Aristotle’s idea of the polis as a collective venture, and question its applicability to the modern world. Our main contention is that the polis’s purpose to provide for human excellence and not just as an arena offering political protection to free market capitalists should not be lightly discarded.Os ensaios sociológicos de Max Weber há muito definiram o Estado moderno como necessariamente coercivo. Caracteriza-se pelo monopólio da protecção armada – e portanto da violência – dentro de um território ou um país. Hoje esta definição do Estado é largamente partilhada entre sociólogos e cientistas políticos. Mas o conceito de Max Weber, relacionado com um certo relativismo, foi vítima ou inspirado por uma epistemologia que o levou a convencer-se que os propósitos do Estado não podiam ser racionalmente examinados e que os ideais, a que chamou “valores”, estão fora do alcance da ciência, quer os dos canibais quer os dos liberais. Robert Nozick chegou por um caminho muito diferente a uma conclusão análoga: o Estado legítimo (mínimo) deve ser apenas um agência de protecção da vida e propriedade que tende a ser monopolista e servir de enquadramento a muitas utopias e “valores”; a neutralidade ou indiferença do Estado é a melhor garantia do florescimento de diferentes formas de vida. Neste texto tentámos explorar os argumentos de ambos os autores e mostrar os pressupostos e narrativas em que baseiam as suas ideias. Um breve confronto com narrativas alternativas muito mais antigas da legitimidade da coerção, que remontam à antiga polis, recordou-nos que os clássicos acreditavam que o seu propósito era favorecer a excelência humana e não se limitava a constituir uma arena que oferecesse uma protecção política aos agentes do mercado. Não podemos regressar aos clássicos, nem endossar a sua visão. Mas não há razão para não examinarmos diferentes concepções do Estado moderno. De facto, o Estado raramente é neutro e cabe-nos decidir se os seus recursos devem ser canalizados para proteger o mercado ou proporcionar os meios para a busca da felicidade, ou uma mistura de ambos, ou de nenhum destes propósitos. Um obstáculo a uma análise mais profunda parece ser a presunção comummente aceite de que o pluralismo é incompatível com o “perfeccionismo”, i.e., que o descrédito ou o afastamento do Estado do favorecimento de toda e qualquer concepção da vida boa é a única, ou pelo menos a melhor, garantia do liberalismo. A melhor garantia do liberalismo, segundo alguns autores, não é a tolerância de diferentes modos de capturar a verdade ou o respeito das luzes nas mentes dos outros, mas a ausência de verdade ou de convicções tanto no domínio moral como político. Com efeito, se o Estado é essencialmente um poder protector, coercivo ou violento, talvez seja preferível que seja indiferente à educação, às artes, a investigação científica ou a todas as formas de vida boa. Queremos sugerir que tal presunção merece ser clarificada.Universidade Católica Portuguesa2015-06-01T00:00:00Zjournal articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.34632/gaudiumsciendi.2015.2766oai:ojs.revistas.ucp.pt:article/2766Gaudium Sciendi; No 8 (2015); 58-72Gaudium Sciendi; n. 8 (2015); 58-722182-760510.34632/gaudiumsciendi.2015.n8reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAPporhttps://revistas.ucp.pt/index.php/gaudiumsciendi/article/view/2766https://doi.org/10.34632/gaudiumsciendi.2015.2766https://revistas.ucp.pt/index.php/gaudiumsciendi/article/view/2766/2669Direitos de Autor (c) 2015 José Colen, António Baião, Scott Nelsonhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessColen, JoséBaião, AntónioNelson, Scott2022-09-20T11:32:32Zoai:ojs.revistas.ucp.pt:article/2766Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T15:49:30.282428Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
O que queremos do estado? As limitações das abordagens atuais |
title |
O que queremos do estado? As limitações das abordagens atuais |
spellingShingle |
O que queremos do estado? As limitações das abordagens atuais Colen, José |
title_short |
O que queremos do estado? As limitações das abordagens atuais |
title_full |
O que queremos do estado? As limitações das abordagens atuais |
title_fullStr |
O que queremos do estado? As limitações das abordagens atuais |
title_full_unstemmed |
O que queremos do estado? As limitações das abordagens atuais |
title_sort |
O que queremos do estado? As limitações das abordagens atuais |
author |
Colen, José |
author_facet |
Colen, José Baião, António Nelson, Scott |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Baião, António Nelson, Scott |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Colen, José Baião, António Nelson, Scott |
description |
Robert Nozick finishes Anarchy, State and Utopia with the idea of a utopia where a minimal state would allow the social organization of the most different ways of life. Even if the framework is libertarian, the individual communities could reject laissez-faire market transactions or liberal democracy. Different people have different desires and some would valorize security instead of liberty, or socialism instead of capitalism. Nozick holds that the minimal state, as a framework for utopia, is an inspiring view because it guarantees that the individuals' rights would remain inviolable, allowing them to choose freely what they want to do with their lives. Should this libertarian idea be exported to the organization of different communities? Or does a larger state have some kind of importance to preserve its members' rights? Also, is it possible to understand political liberalism without the state? This is the starting point for our reflection on the role of the state in ensuring pluralism and liberty among individuals and groups. One common assumption is that pluralism or liberalism is incompatible with “perfectionism” i.e. that the state avoiding to support any particular conception of the good life is the only or the best guarantee of liberalism. Tolerance for different ways of grasping the truth or the respect for the lights in others minds is not enough but the liberal State must be grounded in the absence of any belief or truth in both the moral and political realms. Max Weber’s sociological work long ago defined the modern state as necessarily coercive. It was defined by the monopoly of violence inside a country. Even now his definition of the state is widely shared among sociologists and political theorists. But Max Weber’s conception also carried, or went hand-in-hand with the threat of relativism, and fell victim to or was inspired by an epistemological conception that ends with equal treatment for both good and bad people. In this paper we intend to explore the connection between truth and politics and return to a more ancient alternative account of the legitimacy of coercion that goes back to Aristotle’s idea of the polis as a collective venture, and question its applicability to the modern world. Our main contention is that the polis’s purpose to provide for human excellence and not just as an arena offering political protection to free market capitalists should not be lightly discarded. |
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2015 |
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2015-06-01T00:00:00Z |
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journal article info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
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https://doi.org/10.34632/gaudiumsciendi.2015.2766 oai:ojs.revistas.ucp.pt:article/2766 |
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https://doi.org/10.34632/gaudiumsciendi.2015.2766 |
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oai:ojs.revistas.ucp.pt:article/2766 |
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https://revistas.ucp.pt/index.php/gaudiumsciendi/article/view/2766 https://doi.org/10.34632/gaudiumsciendi.2015.2766 https://revistas.ucp.pt/index.php/gaudiumsciendi/article/view/2766/2669 |
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Direitos de Autor (c) 2015 José Colen, António Baião, Scott Nelson http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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Direitos de Autor (c) 2015 José Colen, António Baião, Scott Nelson http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
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openAccess |
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Universidade Católica Portuguesa |
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Universidade Católica Portuguesa |
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Gaudium Sciendi; No 8 (2015); 58-72 Gaudium Sciendi; n. 8 (2015); 58-72 2182-7605 10.34632/gaudiumsciendi.2015.n8 reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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