Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Hoernig, Steffen
Data de Publicação: 2014
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/12130
Resumo: We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system and discrimination between on and off-net prices does not hold up once more than two mobile networks are considered. Indeed, if there are at least three competing networks and enough utility is obtained from receiving calls, only equilibria with finite call prices and receiving prices exist. Private negotiations over access charges then achieve the efficient outcome. Bill & keep (zero access charges) and free outgoing and incoming calls are efficient if and only marginal costs of calls are zero.
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spelling Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party paysMobile network competitionReceiving party payConnectivity breakdownTermination ratesWe show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system and discrimination between on and off-net prices does not hold up once more than two mobile networks are considered. Indeed, if there are at least three competing networks and enough utility is obtained from receiving calls, only equilibria with finite call prices and receiving prices exist. Private negotiations over access charges then achieve the efficient outcome. Bill & keep (zero access charges) and free outgoing and incoming calls are efficient if and only marginal costs of calls are zero.Nova SBERUNHoernig, Steffen2014-05-23T14:49:00Z2014-032014-03-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/12130enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T03:46:57Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/12130Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:20:45.007745Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays
title Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays
spellingShingle Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays
Hoernig, Steffen
Mobile network competition
Receiving party pay
Connectivity breakdown
Termination rates
title_short Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays
title_full Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays
title_fullStr Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays
title_full_unstemmed Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays
title_sort Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays
author Hoernig, Steffen
author_facet Hoernig, Steffen
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Hoernig, Steffen
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Mobile network competition
Receiving party pay
Connectivity breakdown
Termination rates
topic Mobile network competition
Receiving party pay
Connectivity breakdown
Termination rates
description We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system and discrimination between on and off-net prices does not hold up once more than two mobile networks are considered. Indeed, if there are at least three competing networks and enough utility is obtained from receiving calls, only equilibria with finite call prices and receiving prices exist. Private negotiations over access charges then achieve the efficient outcome. Bill & keep (zero access charges) and free outgoing and incoming calls are efficient if and only marginal costs of calls are zero.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-05-23T14:49:00Z
2014-03
2014-03-01T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/12130
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/12130
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
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