Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Awad, Ghina
Data de Publicação: 2023
Outros Autores: Ghanem, Mohamed Gaber
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425
https://doi.org/Awad, G., and Ghanem, M. G. (2023). Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance. Dutch Journal of Finance and Management, 6(1), 20594. https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463
https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463
Resumo: This study explores the different attributes of audit committees and boards of directors' effect on firm performance. Mainly the board’s size and independence and the audit committee’s employment, size, independence, financial experience, and frequency of meetings. This paper also talks about resource dependency theory which considers that. Non-independent directors have a positive effect on firm performance. On the contrary, agency theory suggests that the more independent the board is, the better the performance. Many accounting scandals and worldwide failures in corporate governance have occurred in the past few decades, affecting stakeholders and taking a heavy toll on national and global economies. After many infamous corporates, the United States passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which acted to heighten the responsibilities of the board of directors in corporations, promotes fairness to both shareholders and stakeholders alike by enforcing listed companies to employ independent, knowledgeable, and proactive audit committees and directors and ultimately set the utmost importance on the protection of investors and stakeholders. Taking a sample of 96 companies, the results show that a more extensive and independent board positively affects business results, and the same applies to the implementation of an audit committee. However, our results found no link between the different characteristics of audit committees with firm performance. The findings above give us insight into how companies’ governance operates.
id RCAP_dc5ee85d4b6d182b86e7eae54aeb03f2
oai_identifier_str oai:comum.rcaap.pt:10400.26/45425
network_acronym_str RCAP
network_name_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository_id_str 7160
spelling Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ PerformanceBoard of directorsAudit committeeAgency theoryResource dependency theoryThis study explores the different attributes of audit committees and boards of directors' effect on firm performance. Mainly the board’s size and independence and the audit committee’s employment, size, independence, financial experience, and frequency of meetings. This paper also talks about resource dependency theory which considers that. Non-independent directors have a positive effect on firm performance. On the contrary, agency theory suggests that the more independent the board is, the better the performance. Many accounting scandals and worldwide failures in corporate governance have occurred in the past few decades, affecting stakeholders and taking a heavy toll on national and global economies. After many infamous corporates, the United States passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which acted to heighten the responsibilities of the board of directors in corporations, promotes fairness to both shareholders and stakeholders alike by enforcing listed companies to employ independent, knowledgeable, and proactive audit committees and directors and ultimately set the utmost importance on the protection of investors and stakeholders. Taking a sample of 96 companies, the results show that a more extensive and independent board positively affects business results, and the same applies to the implementation of an audit committee. However, our results found no link between the different characteristics of audit committees with firm performance. The findings above give us insight into how companies’ governance operates.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionIADITI Editions2023-07-07T18:04:01Z2023-07-072023-07-07T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425https://doi.org/Awad, G., and Ghanem, M. G. (2023). Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance. Dutch Journal of Finance and Management, 6(1), 20594. https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463eng2542-4750https://www.djfm-journal.com/article/board-of-directors-audit-committee-and-firms-performance-13463http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAwad, GhinaGhanem, Mohamed Gaberreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-08T06:25:24Zoai:comum.rcaap.pt:10400.26/45425Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:02:49.410053Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance
title Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance
spellingShingle Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance
Awad, Ghina
Board of directors
Audit committee
Agency theory
Resource dependency theory
title_short Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance
title_full Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance
title_fullStr Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance
title_full_unstemmed Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance
title_sort Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance
author Awad, Ghina
author_facet Awad, Ghina
Ghanem, Mohamed Gaber
author_role author
author2 Ghanem, Mohamed Gaber
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Awad, Ghina
Ghanem, Mohamed Gaber
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Board of directors
Audit committee
Agency theory
Resource dependency theory
topic Board of directors
Audit committee
Agency theory
Resource dependency theory
description This study explores the different attributes of audit committees and boards of directors' effect on firm performance. Mainly the board’s size and independence and the audit committee’s employment, size, independence, financial experience, and frequency of meetings. This paper also talks about resource dependency theory which considers that. Non-independent directors have a positive effect on firm performance. On the contrary, agency theory suggests that the more independent the board is, the better the performance. Many accounting scandals and worldwide failures in corporate governance have occurred in the past few decades, affecting stakeholders and taking a heavy toll on national and global economies. After many infamous corporates, the United States passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which acted to heighten the responsibilities of the board of directors in corporations, promotes fairness to both shareholders and stakeholders alike by enforcing listed companies to employ independent, knowledgeable, and proactive audit committees and directors and ultimately set the utmost importance on the protection of investors and stakeholders. Taking a sample of 96 companies, the results show that a more extensive and independent board positively affects business results, and the same applies to the implementation of an audit committee. However, our results found no link between the different characteristics of audit committees with firm performance. The findings above give us insight into how companies’ governance operates.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-07-07T18:04:01Z
2023-07-07
2023-07-07T00:00:00Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425
https://doi.org/Awad, G., and Ghanem, M. G. (2023). Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance. Dutch Journal of Finance and Management, 6(1), 20594. https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425
https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425
https://doi.org/Awad, G., and Ghanem, M. G. (2023). Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance. Dutch Journal of Finance and Management, 6(1), 20594. https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463
https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 2542-4750
https://www.djfm-journal.com/article/board-of-directors-audit-committee-and-firms-performance-13463
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv IADITI Editions
publisher.none.fl_str_mv IADITI Editions
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1799131693335969792