Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425 https://doi.org/Awad, G., and Ghanem, M. G. (2023). Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance. Dutch Journal of Finance and Management, 6(1), 20594. https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463 https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463 |
Resumo: | This study explores the different attributes of audit committees and boards of directors' effect on firm performance. Mainly the board’s size and independence and the audit committee’s employment, size, independence, financial experience, and frequency of meetings. This paper also talks about resource dependency theory which considers that. Non-independent directors have a positive effect on firm performance. On the contrary, agency theory suggests that the more independent the board is, the better the performance. Many accounting scandals and worldwide failures in corporate governance have occurred in the past few decades, affecting stakeholders and taking a heavy toll on national and global economies. After many infamous corporates, the United States passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which acted to heighten the responsibilities of the board of directors in corporations, promotes fairness to both shareholders and stakeholders alike by enforcing listed companies to employ independent, knowledgeable, and proactive audit committees and directors and ultimately set the utmost importance on the protection of investors and stakeholders. Taking a sample of 96 companies, the results show that a more extensive and independent board positively affects business results, and the same applies to the implementation of an audit committee. However, our results found no link between the different characteristics of audit committees with firm performance. The findings above give us insight into how companies’ governance operates. |
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Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ PerformanceBoard of directorsAudit committeeAgency theoryResource dependency theoryThis study explores the different attributes of audit committees and boards of directors' effect on firm performance. Mainly the board’s size and independence and the audit committee’s employment, size, independence, financial experience, and frequency of meetings. This paper also talks about resource dependency theory which considers that. Non-independent directors have a positive effect on firm performance. On the contrary, agency theory suggests that the more independent the board is, the better the performance. Many accounting scandals and worldwide failures in corporate governance have occurred in the past few decades, affecting stakeholders and taking a heavy toll on national and global economies. After many infamous corporates, the United States passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which acted to heighten the responsibilities of the board of directors in corporations, promotes fairness to both shareholders and stakeholders alike by enforcing listed companies to employ independent, knowledgeable, and proactive audit committees and directors and ultimately set the utmost importance on the protection of investors and stakeholders. Taking a sample of 96 companies, the results show that a more extensive and independent board positively affects business results, and the same applies to the implementation of an audit committee. However, our results found no link between the different characteristics of audit committees with firm performance. The findings above give us insight into how companies’ governance operates.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionIADITI Editions2023-07-07T18:04:01Z2023-07-072023-07-07T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425https://doi.org/Awad, G., and Ghanem, M. G. (2023). Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance. Dutch Journal of Finance and Management, 6(1), 20594. https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463eng2542-4750https://www.djfm-journal.com/article/board-of-directors-audit-committee-and-firms-performance-13463http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAwad, GhinaGhanem, Mohamed Gaberreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-08T06:25:24Zoai:comum.rcaap.pt:10400.26/45425Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T18:02:49.410053Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance |
title |
Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance |
spellingShingle |
Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance Awad, Ghina Board of directors Audit committee Agency theory Resource dependency theory |
title_short |
Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance |
title_full |
Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance |
title_fullStr |
Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance |
title_full_unstemmed |
Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance |
title_sort |
Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance |
author |
Awad, Ghina |
author_facet |
Awad, Ghina Ghanem, Mohamed Gaber |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Ghanem, Mohamed Gaber |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Awad, Ghina Ghanem, Mohamed Gaber |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Board of directors Audit committee Agency theory Resource dependency theory |
topic |
Board of directors Audit committee Agency theory Resource dependency theory |
description |
This study explores the different attributes of audit committees and boards of directors' effect on firm performance. Mainly the board’s size and independence and the audit committee’s employment, size, independence, financial experience, and frequency of meetings. This paper also talks about resource dependency theory which considers that. Non-independent directors have a positive effect on firm performance. On the contrary, agency theory suggests that the more independent the board is, the better the performance. Many accounting scandals and worldwide failures in corporate governance have occurred in the past few decades, affecting stakeholders and taking a heavy toll on national and global economies. After many infamous corporates, the United States passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which acted to heighten the responsibilities of the board of directors in corporations, promotes fairness to both shareholders and stakeholders alike by enforcing listed companies to employ independent, knowledgeable, and proactive audit committees and directors and ultimately set the utmost importance on the protection of investors and stakeholders. Taking a sample of 96 companies, the results show that a more extensive and independent board positively affects business results, and the same applies to the implementation of an audit committee. However, our results found no link between the different characteristics of audit committees with firm performance. The findings above give us insight into how companies’ governance operates. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-07-07T18:04:01Z 2023-07-07 2023-07-07T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425 https://doi.org/Awad, G., and Ghanem, M. G. (2023). Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance. Dutch Journal of Finance and Management, 6(1), 20594. https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463 http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425 https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10400.26/45425 https://doi.org/Awad, G., and Ghanem, M. G. (2023). Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Firms’ Performance. Dutch Journal of Finance and Management, 6(1), 20594. https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463 https://doi.org/10.55267/djfm/13463 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
2542-4750 https://www.djfm-journal.com/article/board-of-directors-audit-committee-and-firms-performance-13463 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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IADITI Editions |
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IADITI Editions |
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reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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