Constitutional Courts and Legislatures: Institutional Terms of Engagement

• Autor(a) principal: Kumm, Mattias
• Data de Publicação: 2017
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
• Texto Completo: https://doi.org/10.34632/catolicalawreview.2017.1975

The debate about the legitimacy of judicial review has arguably been misframed. The question is not whether judicial review can be justified, but how judicial institutions need to be designed and how the relationship between the judicial and the legislative branches must be structured in order for it to be legitimate. After briefly describing the point of judicial review and introducing a normative standard for its legitimate institutionalization, the article analyzes a number of variables that, taken together, determine whether or not such standard is met. A third part briefly illustrates the usefulness of the established framework by analyzing and assessing the institutionalization of judicial review in the US and in the UK. As will become clear, both are problematic outlier cases: In the US the institutional position of the Supreme Court is too strong in its relationship the legislature, effectively enabling juristocracy. In the UK the position of the courts is too weak, effectively enabling electoral authoritarianism.