Fiber investment and access under uncertainty

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bourreau, Marc
Data de Publicação: 2020
Outros Autores: Cambini, Carlo, Hoernig, Steffen, Vogelsang, Ingo
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/99907
Resumo: Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.
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spelling Fiber investment and access under uncertaintylong-term contracts, risk premia, and access optionsAccess optionsLong-term contractsNext generation networksRisk premiumUncertaintyEconomics and EconometricsRegulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)RUNBourreau, MarcCambini, CarloHoernig, SteffenVogelsang, Ingo2022-03-31T00:31:40Z2020-042020-04-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/99907eng0922-680XPURE: 17487723https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09402-3info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:46:37Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/99907Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:39:16.797219Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Fiber investment and access under uncertainty
long-term contracts, risk premia, and access options
title Fiber investment and access under uncertainty
spellingShingle Fiber investment and access under uncertainty
Bourreau, Marc
Access options
Long-term contracts
Next generation networks
Risk premium
Uncertainty
Economics and Econometrics
title_short Fiber investment and access under uncertainty
title_full Fiber investment and access under uncertainty
title_fullStr Fiber investment and access under uncertainty
title_full_unstemmed Fiber investment and access under uncertainty
title_sort Fiber investment and access under uncertainty
author Bourreau, Marc
author_facet Bourreau, Marc
Cambini, Carlo
Hoernig, Steffen
Vogelsang, Ingo
author_role author
author2 Cambini, Carlo
Hoernig, Steffen
Vogelsang, Ingo
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)
RUN
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bourreau, Marc
Cambini, Carlo
Hoernig, Steffen
Vogelsang, Ingo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Access options
Long-term contracts
Next generation networks
Risk premium
Uncertainty
Economics and Econometrics
topic Access options
Long-term contracts
Next generation networks
Risk premium
Uncertainty
Economics and Econometrics
description Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-04
2020-04-01T00:00:00Z
2022-03-31T00:31:40Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/99907
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/99907
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 0922-680X
PURE: 17487723
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09402-3
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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