Competitive vertical integration

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pontes, José Pedro
Data de Publicação: 1992
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22635
Resumo: In the bilateral monopoly case, optimality is a necessary condition so that vertical integration is a noncooperative equilibrium: the combined profits of upstream and downstream firms rise with merger. On the other hand, with a bilateral duopoly where the firms decide to merge vertically sequentially, optimality is not a necessary condition of a noncooperative equilibrium. Combined upstream and downstream profits may decrease with vertical integration. Our case is of Prisoner's Dilemma type. Each downstream firm tries to secure unilaterally a cost advantage by merging vertically. As every downstream firm follows this strategy, all outputs increase with a negative impact upon market price and profits.
id RCAP_ea078a7bf65999362dd48c2ba80f6b71
oai_identifier_str oai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/22635
network_acronym_str RCAP
network_name_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository_id_str 7160
spelling Competitive vertical integrationFirmsMergerCompetitivenessMonopolyPriceIn the bilateral monopoly case, optimality is a necessary condition so that vertical integration is a noncooperative equilibrium: the combined profits of upstream and downstream firms rise with merger. On the other hand, with a bilateral duopoly where the firms decide to merge vertically sequentially, optimality is not a necessary condition of a noncooperative equilibrium. Combined upstream and downstream profits may decrease with vertical integration. Our case is of Prisoner's Dilemma type. Each downstream firm tries to secure unilaterally a cost advantage by merging vertically. As every downstream firm follows this strategy, all outputs increase with a negative impact upon market price and profits.Repositório da Universidade de LisboaPontes, José Pedro2021-12-06T12:19:53Z19921992-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22635engPontes, José Pedro. 1992. "Competitive vertical integration". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 32 -1992/DEinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-03-06T14:52:10Zoai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/22635Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T17:07:01.046451Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Competitive vertical integration
title Competitive vertical integration
spellingShingle Competitive vertical integration
Pontes, José Pedro
Firms
Merger
Competitiveness
Monopoly
Price
title_short Competitive vertical integration
title_full Competitive vertical integration
title_fullStr Competitive vertical integration
title_full_unstemmed Competitive vertical integration
title_sort Competitive vertical integration
author Pontes, José Pedro
author_facet Pontes, José Pedro
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pontes, José Pedro
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Firms
Merger
Competitiveness
Monopoly
Price
topic Firms
Merger
Competitiveness
Monopoly
Price
description In the bilateral monopoly case, optimality is a necessary condition so that vertical integration is a noncooperative equilibrium: the combined profits of upstream and downstream firms rise with merger. On the other hand, with a bilateral duopoly where the firms decide to merge vertically sequentially, optimality is not a necessary condition of a noncooperative equilibrium. Combined upstream and downstream profits may decrease with vertical integration. Our case is of Prisoner's Dilemma type. Each downstream firm tries to secure unilaterally a cost advantage by merging vertically. As every downstream firm follows this strategy, all outputs increase with a negative impact upon market price and profits.
publishDate 1992
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1992
1992-01-01T00:00:00Z
2021-12-06T12:19:53Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22635
url http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/22635
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Pontes, José Pedro. 1992. "Competitive vertical integration". Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão - DE Working papers nº 32 -1992/DE
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1799131163032289280

Registros relacionados