Oversee and Punish: Understanding the Fight Against Corruption Involving Government Workers in Brazil
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i2.2716 |
Resumo: | This exploratory study leverages a major dataset of official penalties against Brazilian bureaucrats enforced between January 2003 and November 2014, when 5,005 expulsive sanctions were enforced, 68.5% of which concerned acts of corruption. The analysis and discussion also integrate qualitative data gathered through 24 semi-structured interviews with civil servants who were integrity enforcers. Despite the rapid increase in the number of penalties enforced over the years, the creation of a robust set of disciplinary norms and an anti-corruption agency have not secured a fully operational horizontal accountability system within the executive. A great variance of corruption control was observed across agencies, manifested through disproportionate enforcement, not only of overall sanctions but also of corruption and non-corruption-related penalties. In light of the self‐protective behaviour of civil servants, who openly say they do not feel comfortable in the role of corruption fighters, the article advances an argument on ‘convenient accountability’—a kind of institutional abdication combined with a reluctance for peer monitoring, with outcomes that can be described as satisficing for integrity agents. This institutional aspect poses a risk to internal disciplinary systems and increases dependence upon external actors of accountability, compromising the efficiency of both. |
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Oversee and Punish: Understanding the Fight Against Corruption Involving Government Workers in Brazilaccountability; Brazil; bureaucracy; civil service; corruption; punishmentThis exploratory study leverages a major dataset of official penalties against Brazilian bureaucrats enforced between January 2003 and November 2014, when 5,005 expulsive sanctions were enforced, 68.5% of which concerned acts of corruption. The analysis and discussion also integrate qualitative data gathered through 24 semi-structured interviews with civil servants who were integrity enforcers. Despite the rapid increase in the number of penalties enforced over the years, the creation of a robust set of disciplinary norms and an anti-corruption agency have not secured a fully operational horizontal accountability system within the executive. A great variance of corruption control was observed across agencies, manifested through disproportionate enforcement, not only of overall sanctions but also of corruption and non-corruption-related penalties. In light of the self‐protective behaviour of civil servants, who openly say they do not feel comfortable in the role of corruption fighters, the article advances an argument on ‘convenient accountability’—a kind of institutional abdication combined with a reluctance for peer monitoring, with outcomes that can be described as satisficing for integrity agents. This institutional aspect poses a risk to internal disciplinary systems and increases dependence upon external actors of accountability, compromising the efficiency of both.Cogitatio2020-05-28info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i2.2716oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/2716Politics and Governance; Vol 8, No 2 (2020): Fighting Corruption in the Developed World: Dimensions, Patterns, Remedies; 140-1522183-2463reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAPenghttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/2716https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i2.2716https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/2716/2716https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/downloadSuppFile/2716/812Copyright (c) 2020 Fernanda Odillahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessOdilla, Fernanda2022-12-22T15:15:58Zoai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/2716Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T16:22:14.531072Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Oversee and Punish: Understanding the Fight Against Corruption Involving Government Workers in Brazil |
title |
Oversee and Punish: Understanding the Fight Against Corruption Involving Government Workers in Brazil |
spellingShingle |
Oversee and Punish: Understanding the Fight Against Corruption Involving Government Workers in Brazil Odilla, Fernanda accountability; Brazil; bureaucracy; civil service; corruption; punishment |
title_short |
Oversee and Punish: Understanding the Fight Against Corruption Involving Government Workers in Brazil |
title_full |
Oversee and Punish: Understanding the Fight Against Corruption Involving Government Workers in Brazil |
title_fullStr |
Oversee and Punish: Understanding the Fight Against Corruption Involving Government Workers in Brazil |
title_full_unstemmed |
Oversee and Punish: Understanding the Fight Against Corruption Involving Government Workers in Brazil |
title_sort |
Oversee and Punish: Understanding the Fight Against Corruption Involving Government Workers in Brazil |
author |
Odilla, Fernanda |
author_facet |
Odilla, Fernanda |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Odilla, Fernanda |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
accountability; Brazil; bureaucracy; civil service; corruption; punishment |
topic |
accountability; Brazil; bureaucracy; civil service; corruption; punishment |
description |
This exploratory study leverages a major dataset of official penalties against Brazilian bureaucrats enforced between January 2003 and November 2014, when 5,005 expulsive sanctions were enforced, 68.5% of which concerned acts of corruption. The analysis and discussion also integrate qualitative data gathered through 24 semi-structured interviews with civil servants who were integrity enforcers. Despite the rapid increase in the number of penalties enforced over the years, the creation of a robust set of disciplinary norms and an anti-corruption agency have not secured a fully operational horizontal accountability system within the executive. A great variance of corruption control was observed across agencies, manifested through disproportionate enforcement, not only of overall sanctions but also of corruption and non-corruption-related penalties. In light of the self‐protective behaviour of civil servants, who openly say they do not feel comfortable in the role of corruption fighters, the article advances an argument on ‘convenient accountability’—a kind of institutional abdication combined with a reluctance for peer monitoring, with outcomes that can be described as satisficing for integrity agents. This institutional aspect poses a risk to internal disciplinary systems and increases dependence upon external actors of accountability, compromising the efficiency of both. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-05-28 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i2.2716 oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/2716 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i2.2716 |
identifier_str_mv |
oai:ojs.cogitatiopress.com:article/2716 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/2716 https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i2.2716 https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/2716/2716 https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/downloadSuppFile/2716/812 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Fernanda Odilla http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Fernanda Odilla http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cogitatio |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Cogitatio |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Politics and Governance; Vol 8, No 2 (2020): Fighting Corruption in the Developed World: Dimensions, Patterns, Remedies; 140-152 2183-2463 reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
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