Strategic optimal premium on a merger and acquisition process a game theory approach
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/138159 |
Resumo: | From a perspective in which mergers and acquisitions can generate value through undervaluation, control, or synergies and taking into consideration that the form of payment, size of the acquirer, and type of target company (public or private) affect the amount of value created on an M&A process. It was possible to use a game theory negotiation model to understand the incentives, interactions, and strategic solutions on an M&A operation to find out the theoretical optimal strategic premium in any M&A process. From this theoretical model, it was found out that the empiric solution of the acquirer giving up almost all the value created by the transaction upon announcement is not optimal or even strategic. Acquirers theoretically should avoid giving up all the value in the transaction, as it exists an optimal strategic premium to share that is different to give up all value. It was also found that all cash transactions are not strategic and that acquirers should always pay in stock as much as they can in the operation to increase their benefits. As this is a theoretical model and the solution differs greatly from the empiric solution it has to be established that the model fails to fully explain the situation in hand. The lack of sufficient variables on the model makes it unable to properly assess the situation and generate a believable outcome. Therefore, the empiric solution remains as the optimal premium to be paid. |
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Strategic optimal premium on a merger and acquisition process a game theory approachBusiness and managementGame theoryMergers and acquisitionsStrategyPremiumNash equilibriumDomínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e GestãoFrom a perspective in which mergers and acquisitions can generate value through undervaluation, control, or synergies and taking into consideration that the form of payment, size of the acquirer, and type of target company (public or private) affect the amount of value created on an M&A process. It was possible to use a game theory negotiation model to understand the incentives, interactions, and strategic solutions on an M&A operation to find out the theoretical optimal strategic premium in any M&A process. From this theoretical model, it was found out that the empiric solution of the acquirer giving up almost all the value created by the transaction upon announcement is not optimal or even strategic. Acquirers theoretically should avoid giving up all the value in the transaction, as it exists an optimal strategic premium to share that is different to give up all value. It was also found that all cash transactions are not strategic and that acquirers should always pay in stock as much as they can in the operation to increase their benefits. As this is a theoretical model and the solution differs greatly from the empiric solution it has to be established that the model fails to fully explain the situation in hand. The lack of sufficient variables on the model makes it unable to properly assess the situation and generate a believable outcome. Therefore, the empiric solution remains as the optimal premium to be paid.Gianinazzi, VirginiaVejarano, Carlos PomboRUNGalvis, Juan Pablo Sanguino2022-05-18T16:03:20Z2021-09-162021-09-072021-09-16T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/138159TID:202997278enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T05:15:31Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/138159Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:49:01.589269Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Strategic optimal premium on a merger and acquisition process a game theory approach |
title |
Strategic optimal premium on a merger and acquisition process a game theory approach |
spellingShingle |
Strategic optimal premium on a merger and acquisition process a game theory approach Galvis, Juan Pablo Sanguino Business and management Game theory Mergers and acquisitions Strategy Premium Nash equilibrium Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão |
title_short |
Strategic optimal premium on a merger and acquisition process a game theory approach |
title_full |
Strategic optimal premium on a merger and acquisition process a game theory approach |
title_fullStr |
Strategic optimal premium on a merger and acquisition process a game theory approach |
title_full_unstemmed |
Strategic optimal premium on a merger and acquisition process a game theory approach |
title_sort |
Strategic optimal premium on a merger and acquisition process a game theory approach |
author |
Galvis, Juan Pablo Sanguino |
author_facet |
Galvis, Juan Pablo Sanguino |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Gianinazzi, Virginia Vejarano, Carlos Pombo RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Galvis, Juan Pablo Sanguino |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Business and management Game theory Mergers and acquisitions Strategy Premium Nash equilibrium Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão |
topic |
Business and management Game theory Mergers and acquisitions Strategy Premium Nash equilibrium Domínio/Área Científica::Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão |
description |
From a perspective in which mergers and acquisitions can generate value through undervaluation, control, or synergies and taking into consideration that the form of payment, size of the acquirer, and type of target company (public or private) affect the amount of value created on an M&A process. It was possible to use a game theory negotiation model to understand the incentives, interactions, and strategic solutions on an M&A operation to find out the theoretical optimal strategic premium in any M&A process. From this theoretical model, it was found out that the empiric solution of the acquirer giving up almost all the value created by the transaction upon announcement is not optimal or even strategic. Acquirers theoretically should avoid giving up all the value in the transaction, as it exists an optimal strategic premium to share that is different to give up all value. It was also found that all cash transactions are not strategic and that acquirers should always pay in stock as much as they can in the operation to increase their benefits. As this is a theoretical model and the solution differs greatly from the empiric solution it has to be established that the model fails to fully explain the situation in hand. The lack of sufficient variables on the model makes it unable to properly assess the situation and generate a believable outcome. Therefore, the empiric solution remains as the optimal premium to be paid. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-09-16 2021-09-07 2021-09-16T00:00:00Z 2022-05-18T16:03:20Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
format |
masterThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/138159 TID:202997278 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/138159 |
identifier_str_mv |
TID:202997278 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação instacron:RCAAP |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799138090316464128 |