Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 1999 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10362/89141 |
Resumo: | In this paper, we propose a perfect competition test which checks whether arbitrarily small coalitions of firms, which behave strategically on costs, are able to manipulate prices in their own benefit. We apply this test to economies with a continuum of differentiated producers. We show that, under thickness conditions on preferences, implying a high degree of substitutability among commodities, there is no monopolistic power neither in economies with constant marginal costs nor in economies with cubic costs. We also give an example of thin markets where monopolistic power prevails. |
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Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost GamesPerfect competitionMonopolistic powerWalrasian equilibriumThick marketsIn this paper, we propose a perfect competition test which checks whether arbitrarily small coalitions of firms, which behave strategically on costs, are able to manipulate prices in their own benefit. We apply this test to economies with a continuum of differentiated producers. We show that, under thickness conditions on preferences, implying a high degree of substitutability among commodities, there is no monopolistic power neither in economies with constant marginal costs nor in economies with cubic costs. We also give an example of thin markets where monopolistic power prevails.Nova SBERUNFaias, MartaMoreno-García, EmmaPáscoa, Mário Rui2019-12-03T09:40:00Z19991999-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/89141engFaias, Marta, Moreno-García, Emma and Páscoa, Mário Rui, Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games (1999). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 345info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-03-11T04:39:36Zoai:run.unl.pt:10362/89141Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T03:36:56.032142Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games |
title |
Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games |
spellingShingle |
Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games Faias, Marta Perfect competition Monopolistic power Walrasian equilibrium Thick markets |
title_short |
Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games |
title_full |
Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games |
title_fullStr |
Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games |
title_full_unstemmed |
Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games |
title_sort |
Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games |
author |
Faias, Marta |
author_facet |
Faias, Marta Moreno-García, Emma Páscoa, Mário Rui |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Moreno-García, Emma Páscoa, Mário Rui |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
RUN |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Faias, Marta Moreno-García, Emma Páscoa, Mário Rui |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Perfect competition Monopolistic power Walrasian equilibrium Thick markets |
topic |
Perfect competition Monopolistic power Walrasian equilibrium Thick markets |
description |
In this paper, we propose a perfect competition test which checks whether arbitrarily small coalitions of firms, which behave strategically on costs, are able to manipulate prices in their own benefit. We apply this test to economies with a continuum of differentiated producers. We show that, under thickness conditions on preferences, implying a high degree of substitutability among commodities, there is no monopolistic power neither in economies with constant marginal costs nor in economies with cubic costs. We also give an example of thin markets where monopolistic power prevails. |
publishDate |
1999 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
1999 1999-01-01T00:00:00Z 2019-12-03T09:40:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/89141 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10362/89141 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Faias, Marta, Moreno-García, Emma and Páscoa, Mário Rui, Non-Manipulability in Walrasian Cost Games (1999). FEUNL Working Paper Series No. 345 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Nova SBE |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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instname_str |
Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
instacron_str |
RCAAP |
institution |
RCAAP |
reponame_str |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
collection |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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1799137986773778432 |