Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquaculture

• Autor(a) principal: Filipe, José António
• Data de Publicação: 2012
• Outros Autores: Ferreira, Manuel Alberto M., Coelho, Manuel Pacheco, Pedro, Maria Isabel
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10071/5676
• topic: Anti-commons theory; Property Rights; Política comum da pesca -- Common fisheries policy

Anti-Commons and bureaucracy have been linked since the study of Buchanan & Yoon (2000). Bureaucracy involves a set of agents that have a deciding power. Conflicting interests, the decision makers inertia or the inertia of the system itself, excessive administrative procedures or excessive administrative circuits push too late decisions, or for non-rational decisions in terms of value creation for economic agents. Property Rights Theory explains new concerns. Considering that an “anti-commons” problem arises when there are multiple rights to exclude, the problem of decision process in aquaculture projects makes sense at this level. However, little attention has been given to the setting where more than one person is assigned with exclusion rights, which may be exercised. “Anti-commons” problem is analyzed in situations in which resources are inefficiently under-utilized rather than over-utilized as in the familiar commons setting. In this study, fisheries problems are studied and some ways to deal with the problem are presented.