Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquaculture

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Filipe, José António
Data de Publicação: 2012
Outros Autores: Ferreira, Manuel Alberto M., Coelho, Manuel Pacheco, Pedro, Maria Isabel
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10071/5676
Resumo: Anti-Commons and bureaucracy have been linked since the study of Buchanan & Yoon (2000). Bureaucracy involves a set of agents that have a deciding power. Conflicting interests, the decision makers inertia or the inertia of the system itself, excessive administrative procedures or excessive administrative circuits push too late decisions, or for non-rational decisions in terms of value creation for economic agents. Property Rights Theory explains new concerns. Considering that an “anti-commons” problem arises when there are multiple rights to exclude, the problem of decision process in aquaculture projects makes sense at this level. However, little attention has been given to the setting where more than one person is assigned with exclusion rights, which may be exercised. “Anti-commons” problem is analyzed in situations in which resources are inefficiently under-utilized rather than over-utilized as in the familiar commons setting. In this study, fisheries problems are studied and some ways to deal with the problem are presented.
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spelling Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquacultureAnti-commons theoryProperty RightsPolítica comum da pesca -- Common fisheries policyAnti-Commons and bureaucracy have been linked since the study of Buchanan & Yoon (2000). Bureaucracy involves a set of agents that have a deciding power. Conflicting interests, the decision makers inertia or the inertia of the system itself, excessive administrative procedures or excessive administrative circuits push too late decisions, or for non-rational decisions in terms of value creation for economic agents. Property Rights Theory explains new concerns. Considering that an “anti-commons” problem arises when there are multiple rights to exclude, the problem of decision process in aquaculture projects makes sense at this level. However, little attention has been given to the setting where more than one person is assigned with exclusion rights, which may be exercised. “Anti-commons” problem is analyzed in situations in which resources are inefficiently under-utilized rather than over-utilized as in the familiar commons setting. In this study, fisheries problems are studied and some ways to deal with the problem are presented.Slovak University of Technology2013-10-01T18:32:46Z2012-01-01T00:00:00Z2012info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10071/5676eng1337-6365Filipe, José AntónioFerreira, Manuel Alberto M.Coelho, Manuel PachecoPedro, Maria Isabelinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-11-09T17:49:47Zoai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/5676Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-19T22:24:29.346827Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquaculture
title Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquaculture
spellingShingle Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquaculture
Filipe, José António
Anti-commons theory
Property Rights
Política comum da pesca -- Common fisheries policy
title_short Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquaculture
title_full Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquaculture
title_fullStr Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquaculture
title_full_unstemmed Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquaculture
title_sort Anti-commons: Fisheries problems and bureaucracy in aquaculture
author Filipe, José António
author_facet Filipe, José António
Ferreira, Manuel Alberto M.
Coelho, Manuel Pacheco
Pedro, Maria Isabel
author_role author
author2 Ferreira, Manuel Alberto M.
Coelho, Manuel Pacheco
Pedro, Maria Isabel
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Filipe, José António
Ferreira, Manuel Alberto M.
Coelho, Manuel Pacheco
Pedro, Maria Isabel
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Anti-commons theory
Property Rights
Política comum da pesca -- Common fisheries policy
topic Anti-commons theory
Property Rights
Política comum da pesca -- Common fisheries policy
description Anti-Commons and bureaucracy have been linked since the study of Buchanan & Yoon (2000). Bureaucracy involves a set of agents that have a deciding power. Conflicting interests, the decision makers inertia or the inertia of the system itself, excessive administrative procedures or excessive administrative circuits push too late decisions, or for non-rational decisions in terms of value creation for economic agents. Property Rights Theory explains new concerns. Considering that an “anti-commons” problem arises when there are multiple rights to exclude, the problem of decision process in aquaculture projects makes sense at this level. However, little attention has been given to the setting where more than one person is assigned with exclusion rights, which may be exercised. “Anti-commons” problem is analyzed in situations in which resources are inefficiently under-utilized rather than over-utilized as in the familiar commons setting. In this study, fisheries problems are studied and some ways to deal with the problem are presented.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z
2012
2013-10-01T18:32:46Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Slovak University of Technology
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Slovak University of Technology
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reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
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