Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da UFSCAR |
Texto Completo: | https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/7302 |
Resumo: | In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks to support human action by a rational principle (formal) and not by the search for an order previously established outside the very principle. Therefore, for Kant, human action is good to be determined only by the rational principle, regardless, so, the realization of any order previously determined. It is concluded, therefore, that in Kantian moral which gives moral value to action is our intention to act in accordance which universal principles that can apply to all men, and not the realization of the end pursued by the will. However, even that assign moral value only the intention of action liable of universalization, Kant would, therefore, removed from his moral philosophy once and for all the possibility of some ultimate end? It is important to note that the very GMM Kant introduces the concept of Bestimmung. This concept states that the reason also has a destination, understood as ultimate goal: the production of a good will. Destination, at least output, suggests to us that eventually there would be a kind of end point of reason, which is nothing more than the production of their own good will. So how can we think that point, without ignoring, of course, that is the intention of the action which gives moral value? Kant, having founded his moral philosophy on the intention of the agent that determines its action by a rational formal principle, would have thus prevented any opening to a teleological theory in his moral philosophy? It is intended, based on these issues and their consequences, show not only that Kant did not rule out his practical philosophy a possible reading finalist, but also made it possible to think of a congruence between formalism and purpose. |
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Rissi, João PauloSantos, Paulo Roberto Licht doshttp://lattes.cnpq.br/1681044854219924http://lattes.cnpq.br/6671109439230591294b55f3-1084-43d8-8fef-7ebed2e9004b2016-09-21T12:29:04Z2016-09-21T12:29:04Z2016-02-25RISSI, João Paulo. Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes. 2016. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) – Universidade Federal de São Carlos, São Carlos, 2016. Disponível em: https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/7302.https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/7302In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks to support human action by a rational principle (formal) and not by the search for an order previously established outside the very principle. Therefore, for Kant, human action is good to be determined only by the rational principle, regardless, so, the realization of any order previously determined. It is concluded, therefore, that in Kantian moral which gives moral value to action is our intention to act in accordance which universal principles that can apply to all men, and not the realization of the end pursued by the will. However, even that assign moral value only the intention of action liable of universalization, Kant would, therefore, removed from his moral philosophy once and for all the possibility of some ultimate end? It is important to note that the very GMM Kant introduces the concept of Bestimmung. This concept states that the reason also has a destination, understood as ultimate goal: the production of a good will. Destination, at least output, suggests to us that eventually there would be a kind of end point of reason, which is nothing more than the production of their own good will. So how can we think that point, without ignoring, of course, that is the intention of the action which gives moral value? Kant, having founded his moral philosophy on the intention of the agent that determines its action by a rational formal principle, would have thus prevented any opening to a teleological theory in his moral philosophy? It is intended, based on these issues and their consequences, show not only that Kant did not rule out his practical philosophy a possible reading finalist, but also made it possible to think of a congruence between formalism and purpose.Na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes1, Immanuel Kant procura fundamentar a ação humana por um princípio racional (formal) e não pela busca de um fim previamente estabelecido exterior ao próprio princípio. Portanto, para Kant, a ação humana é boa ao ser determinada apenas pelo princípio racional, independendo, assim, da realização de algum fim previamente determinado. Conclui-se, deste modo, que na moral kantiana o que confere valor moral à ação é a nossa intenção de agir segundo princípios universais, que possam valer para todos os homens, e não a realização do fim almejado pela vontade. Entretanto, mesmo que atribua valor moral tão somente à intenção da ação passível de universalização, teria Kant, com isso, suprimido de sua filosofia moral de uma vez por todas a possibilidade de algum fim último? É importante notar que na própria FMC Kant introduz o conceito de Bestimmung. Este conceito enuncia que a razão também possui uma destinação, entendida como fim último: a produção de uma vontade boa. Destinação, ao menos de saída, sugere-nos que haveria eventualmente uma espécie de ponto de chegada da razão, que nada mais é do que a produção da própria vontade boa. Portanto, como podemos pensar esse ponto, sem desconsiderar, obviamente, que é a intenção da ação que lhe confere valor moral? Kant, tendo fundamentado sua filosofia moral na intenção do agente que determina sua ação por um princípio racional formal, teria, com isso, impossibilitado toda e qualquer abertura para uma teoria teleológica em sua filosofia moral? Pretende-se, com base nessas questões e suas consequências, mostrar que Kant não apenas não excluiu de sua filosofia prática uma possível leitura finalista, mas, também, tornou possível pensar em uma congruência entre formalismo e finalidade.Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)porUniversidade Federal de São CarlosCâmpus São CarlosPrograma de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia - PPGFilUFSCarImmanuel KantFormalismoFinalidadeMoralCIENCIAS HUMANAS::EDUCACAOCIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIAFormalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisOnline6006005877cd14-b1a1-4dfc-a43c-c9e98c251734info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSCARinstname:Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCAR)instacron:UFSCARORIGINALDissJPRff.pdfDissJPRff.pdfapplication/pdf954750https://repositorio.ufscar.br/bitstream/ufscar/7302/1/DissJPRff.pdfcf98270f3c7c986f269454fca84cb721MD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81957https://repositorio.ufscar.br/bitstream/ufscar/7302/2/license.txtae0398b6f8b235e40ad82cba6c50031dMD52TEXTDissJPRff.pdf.txtDissJPRff.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain237383https://repositorio.ufscar.br/bitstream/ufscar/7302/3/DissJPRff.pdf.txt294c5f86950154f1ebfb9a428db7f200MD53THUMBNAILDissJPRff.pdf.jpgDissJPRff.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg6873https://repositorio.ufscar.br/bitstream/ufscar/7302/4/DissJPRff.pdf.jpgdfe25d3131f25a526f6ac9b6723658f1MD54ufscar/73022023-09-18 18:30:49.221oai:repositorio.ufscar.br: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Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttps://repositorio.ufscar.br/oai/requestopendoar:43222023-09-18T18:30:49Repositório Institucional da UFSCAR - Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCAR)false |
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv |
Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes |
title |
Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes |
spellingShingle |
Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes Rissi, João Paulo Immanuel Kant Formalismo Finalidade Moral CIENCIAS HUMANAS::EDUCACAO CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
title_short |
Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes |
title_full |
Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes |
title_fullStr |
Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes |
title_full_unstemmed |
Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes |
title_sort |
Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes |
author |
Rissi, João Paulo |
author_facet |
Rissi, João Paulo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.authorlattes.por.fl_str_mv |
http://lattes.cnpq.br/6671109439230591 |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Rissi, João Paulo |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Santos, Paulo Roberto Licht dos |
dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://lattes.cnpq.br/1681044854219924 |
dc.contributor.authorID.fl_str_mv |
294b55f3-1084-43d8-8fef-7ebed2e9004b |
contributor_str_mv |
Santos, Paulo Roberto Licht dos |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Immanuel Kant Formalismo Finalidade Moral |
topic |
Immanuel Kant Formalismo Finalidade Moral CIENCIAS HUMANAS::EDUCACAO CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv |
CIENCIAS HUMANAS::EDUCACAO CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
description |
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks to support human action by a rational principle (formal) and not by the search for an order previously established outside the very principle. Therefore, for Kant, human action is good to be determined only by the rational principle, regardless, so, the realization of any order previously determined. It is concluded, therefore, that in Kantian moral which gives moral value to action is our intention to act in accordance which universal principles that can apply to all men, and not the realization of the end pursued by the will. However, even that assign moral value only the intention of action liable of universalization, Kant would, therefore, removed from his moral philosophy once and for all the possibility of some ultimate end? It is important to note that the very GMM Kant introduces the concept of Bestimmung. This concept states that the reason also has a destination, understood as ultimate goal: the production of a good will. Destination, at least output, suggests to us that eventually there would be a kind of end point of reason, which is nothing more than the production of their own good will. So how can we think that point, without ignoring, of course, that is the intention of the action which gives moral value? Kant, having founded his moral philosophy on the intention of the agent that determines its action by a rational formal principle, would have thus prevented any opening to a teleological theory in his moral philosophy? It is intended, based on these issues and their consequences, show not only that Kant did not rule out his practical philosophy a possible reading finalist, but also made it possible to think of a congruence between formalism and purpose. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2016-09-21T12:29:04Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2016-09-21T12:29:04Z |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2016-02-25 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
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masterThesis |
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publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv |
RISSI, João Paulo. Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes. 2016. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) – Universidade Federal de São Carlos, São Carlos, 2016. Disponível em: https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/7302. |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/7302 |
identifier_str_mv |
RISSI, João Paulo. Formalismo e finalidade na moral kantiana : a destinação da razão na fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes. 2016. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) – Universidade Federal de São Carlos, São Carlos, 2016. Disponível em: https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/7302. |
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Universidade Federal de São Carlos Câmpus São Carlos |
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Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia - PPGFil |
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Universidade Federal de São Carlos Câmpus São Carlos |
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