A computational exercise on the bureaucratic corruption within the principal-agent approach with lotteries

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Matsuoka, Danilo Hiroshi
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Economic Analysis of law Review
Texto Completo: https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12733
Resumo: This paper models a corruption problem through the principal-agent framework with lotteries where the bureaucrat is regarded as the agent and the society, as the principal. The model contemplates three variables: bureaucratic efficiency, compensation and level of honesty. Solutions for the model were given using linear program algorithms. The optimal contracts indicate that: (1) under an unmonitored scenario, it is possible that the society be better off in the presence of extreme corruption; (2) risk-loving bureaucrats can provide more righteous conducts and increase the society’s expected utility; (3) altruist bureaucrats makes the society better off while spiteful bureaucrats makes the society worse off; and (4) higher reservation utility tends to increase the probability of the bureaucrats receive a high compensation.
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spelling A computational exercise on the bureaucratic corruption within the principal-agent approach with lotteriesCorruption Principal-Agent Moral HazardLotteriesThis paper models a corruption problem through the principal-agent framework with lotteries where the bureaucrat is regarded as the agent and the society, as the principal. The model contemplates three variables: bureaucratic efficiency, compensation and level of honesty. Solutions for the model were given using linear program algorithms. The optimal contracts indicate that: (1) under an unmonitored scenario, it is possible that the society be better off in the presence of extreme corruption; (2) risk-loving bureaucrats can provide more righteous conducts and increase the society’s expected utility; (3) altruist bureaucrats makes the society better off while spiteful bureaucrats makes the society worse off; and (4) higher reservation utility tends to increase the probability of the bureaucrats receive a high compensation.Universidade Católica de Brasília2022-06-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionComputacional; SimulaçãoAvaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewedapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/1273310.31501/ealr.v13i1.12733Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 13 No. 1 (2022): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 289-308Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 13 Núm. 1 (2022): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 289-308Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 13 n. 1 (2022): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 289-3082178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBenghttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12733/11140Copyright (c) 2022 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMatsuoka, Danilo Hiroshi2023-06-15T18:38:44Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/12733Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2023-06-15T18:38:44Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A computational exercise on the bureaucratic corruption within the principal-agent approach with lotteries
title A computational exercise on the bureaucratic corruption within the principal-agent approach with lotteries
spellingShingle A computational exercise on the bureaucratic corruption within the principal-agent approach with lotteries
Matsuoka, Danilo Hiroshi
Corruption
Principal-Agent
Moral Hazard
Lotteries
title_short A computational exercise on the bureaucratic corruption within the principal-agent approach with lotteries
title_full A computational exercise on the bureaucratic corruption within the principal-agent approach with lotteries
title_fullStr A computational exercise on the bureaucratic corruption within the principal-agent approach with lotteries
title_full_unstemmed A computational exercise on the bureaucratic corruption within the principal-agent approach with lotteries
title_sort A computational exercise on the bureaucratic corruption within the principal-agent approach with lotteries
author Matsuoka, Danilo Hiroshi
author_facet Matsuoka, Danilo Hiroshi
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Matsuoka, Danilo Hiroshi
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Corruption
Principal-Agent
Moral Hazard
Lotteries
topic Corruption
Principal-Agent
Moral Hazard
Lotteries
description This paper models a corruption problem through the principal-agent framework with lotteries where the bureaucrat is regarded as the agent and the society, as the principal. The model contemplates three variables: bureaucratic efficiency, compensation and level of honesty. Solutions for the model were given using linear program algorithms. The optimal contracts indicate that: (1) under an unmonitored scenario, it is possible that the society be better off in the presence of extreme corruption; (2) risk-loving bureaucrats can provide more righteous conducts and increase the society’s expected utility; (3) altruist bureaucrats makes the society better off while spiteful bureaucrats makes the society worse off; and (4) higher reservation utility tends to increase the probability of the bureaucrats receive a high compensation.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-06-27
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Computacional; Simulação
Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12733
10.31501/ealr.v13i1.12733
url https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12733
identifier_str_mv 10.31501/ealr.v13i1.12733
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/12733/11140
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Economic Analysis of Law Review
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Economic Analysis of Law Review
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Católica de Brasília
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 13 No. 1 (2022): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 289-308
Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 13 Núm. 1 (2022): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 289-308
Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 13 n. 1 (2022): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 289-308
2178-0587
reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review
instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron:UCB
instname_str Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron_str UCB
institution UCB
reponame_str Economic Analysis of law Review
collection Economic Analysis of law Review
repository.name.fl_str_mv Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com
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