Does uncertainty deter crime?
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Economic Analysis of law Review |
Texto Completo: | https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8709 |
Resumo: | When the probability of apprehension and conviction is observed with noise, the decision to commit a crime is influenced by the uncertainty about the true probability. In this note we show that increases in the uncertainty discourage criminal behavior only in societies with high criminal rates -- where individuals are already highly prone to act illegally. Our findings also show that severity of punishment and uncertainty about the probability of apprehension and conviction are substitute (complementary) anti-crime policy instruments whenever the size of sanction is high (low, respectively) enough. |
id |
UCB-6_a26d39df2c63829fc46af28ce7ec7a6c |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/8709 |
network_acronym_str |
UCB-6 |
network_name_str |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Does uncertainty deter crime?uncertainty economics of crime incentives.When the probability of apprehension and conviction is observed with noise, the decision to commit a crime is influenced by the uncertainty about the true probability. In this note we show that increases in the uncertainty discourage criminal behavior only in societies with high criminal rates -- where individuals are already highly prone to act illegally. Our findings also show that severity of punishment and uncertainty about the probability of apprehension and conviction are substitute (complementary) anti-crime policy instruments whenever the size of sanction is high (low, respectively) enough.Universidade Católica de Brasília2018-09-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionEscolha sob incertezaAvaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewedapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8709Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 9 No. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 57-62Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 9 Núm. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 57-62Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 9 n. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 57-622178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBenghttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8709/5849Copyright (c) 2018 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessde Carvalho Griebeler, Marcelo2023-06-15T18:36:27Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/8709Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2023-06-15T18:36:27Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Does uncertainty deter crime? |
title |
Does uncertainty deter crime? |
spellingShingle |
Does uncertainty deter crime? de Carvalho Griebeler, Marcelo uncertainty economics of crime incentives. |
title_short |
Does uncertainty deter crime? |
title_full |
Does uncertainty deter crime? |
title_fullStr |
Does uncertainty deter crime? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Does uncertainty deter crime? |
title_sort |
Does uncertainty deter crime? |
author |
de Carvalho Griebeler, Marcelo |
author_facet |
de Carvalho Griebeler, Marcelo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
de Carvalho Griebeler, Marcelo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
uncertainty economics of crime incentives. |
topic |
uncertainty economics of crime incentives. |
description |
When the probability of apprehension and conviction is observed with noise, the decision to commit a crime is influenced by the uncertainty about the true probability. In this note we show that increases in the uncertainty discourage criminal behavior only in societies with high criminal rates -- where individuals are already highly prone to act illegally. Our findings also show that severity of punishment and uncertainty about the probability of apprehension and conviction are substitute (complementary) anti-crime policy instruments whenever the size of sanction is high (low, respectively) enough. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-03 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Escolha sob incerteza Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8709 |
url |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8709 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/8709/5849 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Economic Analysis of Law Review info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Economic Analysis of Law Review |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 9 No. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 57-62 Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 9 Núm. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 57-62 Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 9 n. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 57-62 2178-0587 reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) instacron:UCB |
instname_str |
Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
instacron_str |
UCB |
institution |
UCB |
reponame_str |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
collection |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1798675420637298688 |