Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: Preference and Opportunistic Effects on Brazilian Courts
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Economic Analysis of law Review |
Texto Completo: | https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/9240 |
Resumo: | The prolific literature on de facto judicial independence misses a key variable to explain political bias: the government’s discretion over the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In this paper, we explore a distinct feature of the Brazilian judiciary system to assess political bias due to government appointment discretion. As there are two courts, the STF (Supreme Federal Court) and the STJ (Superior Court of Justice), that deal with similar matters and have different restrictions on the appointment of their members, it is possible to compare the degree of political influence to which they are subject. We test (1) whether there are differences in the degree of political influence depending on the president’s discretion over the nomination of a justice, and (2) whether the justices actively benefit the party of the president who has appointed them. We find evidence of the first effect, but little of the second. |
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Economic Analysis of law Review |
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Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: Preference and Opportunistic Effects on Brazilian CourtsJudicial independence Supreme Court appointment discretionThe prolific literature on de facto judicial independence misses a key variable to explain political bias: the government’s discretion over the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In this paper, we explore a distinct feature of the Brazilian judiciary system to assess political bias due to government appointment discretion. As there are two courts, the STF (Supreme Federal Court) and the STJ (Superior Court of Justice), that deal with similar matters and have different restrictions on the appointment of their members, it is possible to compare the degree of political influence to which they are subject. We test (1) whether there are differences in the degree of political influence depending on the president’s discretion over the nomination of a justice, and (2) whether the justices actively benefit the party of the president who has appointed them. We find evidence of the first effect, but little of the second.Universidade Católica de Brasília2018-09-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionEmpirical ResearchAvaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewedapplication/pdfhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/9240Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 9 No. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 84-106Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 9 Núm. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 84-106Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 9 n. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 84-1062178-0587reponame:Economic Analysis of law Reviewinstname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)instacron:UCBenghttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/9240/5851Copyright (c) 2018 Economic Analysis of Law Reviewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessde Mendonça Lopes, FelipeFurquim de Azevedo, Paulo2023-06-15T18:36:27Zoai:ojs.portalrevistas.ucb.br:article/9240Revistahttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/ealrONGhttps://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/oaieditor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com2178-05872178-0587opendoar:2023-06-15T18:36:27Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: Preference and Opportunistic Effects on Brazilian Courts |
title |
Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: Preference and Opportunistic Effects on Brazilian Courts |
spellingShingle |
Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: Preference and Opportunistic Effects on Brazilian Courts de Mendonça Lopes, Felipe Judicial independence Supreme Court appointment discretion |
title_short |
Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: Preference and Opportunistic Effects on Brazilian Courts |
title_full |
Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: Preference and Opportunistic Effects on Brazilian Courts |
title_fullStr |
Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: Preference and Opportunistic Effects on Brazilian Courts |
title_full_unstemmed |
Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: Preference and Opportunistic Effects on Brazilian Courts |
title_sort |
Government Appointment Discretion and Judicial Independence: Preference and Opportunistic Effects on Brazilian Courts |
author |
de Mendonça Lopes, Felipe |
author_facet |
de Mendonça Lopes, Felipe Furquim de Azevedo, Paulo |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Furquim de Azevedo, Paulo |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
de Mendonça Lopes, Felipe Furquim de Azevedo, Paulo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Judicial independence Supreme Court appointment discretion |
topic |
Judicial independence Supreme Court appointment discretion |
description |
The prolific literature on de facto judicial independence misses a key variable to explain political bias: the government’s discretion over the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In this paper, we explore a distinct feature of the Brazilian judiciary system to assess political bias due to government appointment discretion. As there are two courts, the STF (Supreme Federal Court) and the STJ (Superior Court of Justice), that deal with similar matters and have different restrictions on the appointment of their members, it is possible to compare the degree of political influence to which they are subject. We test (1) whether there are differences in the degree of political influence depending on the president’s discretion over the nomination of a justice, and (2) whether the justices actively benefit the party of the president who has appointed them. We find evidence of the first effect, but little of the second. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-03 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Empirical Research Avaliado por Pares; Peer Reviewed |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/9240 |
url |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/9240 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/9240/5851 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Economic Analysis of Law Review info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2018 Economic Analysis of Law Review |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Brasília |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 9 No. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 84-106 Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 9 Núm. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 84-106 Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 9 n. 2 (2018): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 84-106 2178-0587 reponame:Economic Analysis of law Review instname:Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) instacron:UCB |
instname_str |
Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
instacron_str |
UCB |
institution |
UCB |
reponame_str |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
collection |
Economic Analysis of law Review |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Economic Analysis of law Review - Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
editor.ealr@gmail.com||sdi@ucb.br||benjaminm.tabak@gmail.com |
_version_ |
1798675420655124480 |