CONCEPTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Outros Autores: | , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Lex Humana |
Texto Completo: | https://seer.ucp.br/seer/index.php/LexHumana/article/view/2596 |
Resumo: | The article is devoted to the concepts of the legal personality of artificial intelligence. The intensive development of AI technologies, which can autonomously make decisions and perform creative and intellectual tasks, raises the question of the need to determine AI's legal status. The main purpose of the study is to propose a concept of conditionally special legal personality that can be applied to certain types of AI. A multi-criteria analysis of works devoted to the development of concepts of the AI legal personality and documents of the judicial authorities of Australia, the UK, the USA, and France were carried out within the framework of the study. The study showed that there is no uniform systematic approach to determining the AI legal personality at the national and international levels. The study highlights the main software-synthesized abilities of some types of intelligence. It is concluded that AI can have a special legal personality only in the presence of certain software-synthesized abilities. Depending on their availability and volume, AI in some cases can be defined solely as a tool in the hands of a person and as an electronic subject of law in other hands. |
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CONCEPTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCECONCEITOS DE PERSONALIDADE JURÍDICA DA INTELIGÊNCIA ARTIFICIALArtificial intelligenceComputer and software technologiesRoboticsLegal personalityDutyLegal relationshipSubjectObjectThe article is devoted to the concepts of the legal personality of artificial intelligence. The intensive development of AI technologies, which can autonomously make decisions and perform creative and intellectual tasks, raises the question of the need to determine AI's legal status. The main purpose of the study is to propose a concept of conditionally special legal personality that can be applied to certain types of AI. A multi-criteria analysis of works devoted to the development of concepts of the AI legal personality and documents of the judicial authorities of Australia, the UK, the USA, and France were carried out within the framework of the study. The study showed that there is no uniform systematic approach to determining the AI legal personality at the national and international levels. The study highlights the main software-synthesized abilities of some types of intelligence. It is concluded that AI can have a special legal personality only in the presence of certain software-synthesized abilities. Depending on their availability and volume, AI in some cases can be defined solely as a tool in the hands of a person and as an electronic subject of law in other hands.O artigo é dedicado aos conceitos da personalidade jurídica da inteligência artificial. O desenvolvimento intensivo das tecnologias de IA, que podem tomar decisões de forma autônoma e executar tarefas criativas e intelectuais, levanta a questão da necessidade de determinar o status legal da IA. O objetivo principal do estudo é propor um conceito de personalidade jurídica condicionalmente especial que possa ser aplicado a certos tipos de IA. Uma análise multicritério de trabalhos dedicados ao desenvolvimento de conceitos de personalidade jurídica da IA e documentos das autoridades judiciais da Austrália, do Reino Unido, dos EUA e da França foi realizada no âmbito do estudo. O estudo mostrou que não há uma abordagem sistemática uniforme para determinar a personalidade jurídica da AI nos níveis nacional e internacional. O estudo destaca as principais capacidades de sintetização de software de alguns tipos de inteligência. Conclui-se que a IA pode ter uma personalidade jurídica especial somente na presença de certas habilidades de sintetização de software. Dependendo de sua disponibilidade e volume, a IA em alguns casos pode ser definida apenas como uma ferramenta nas mãos de uma pessoa e como um sujeito eletrônico de direito em outras mãos.Universidade Católica de Petrópolis2023-05-13info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://seer.ucp.br/seer/index.php/LexHumana/article/view/2596Lex Humana (ISSN 2175-0947); Vol. 15 No. 3 (2023): JUL-SEP; 283-295Lex Humana (ISSN 2175-0947); v. 15 n. 3 (2023): JUL-SET; 283-2952175-0947reponame:Lex Humanainstname:Universidade Católica de Petrópolis (UCP)instacron:UCPenghttps://seer.ucp.br/seer/index.php/LexHumana/article/view/2596/3532Copyright (c) 2023 Lex Humana (ISSN 2175-0947)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSultonova, Laylo Vasyukov, Vitalii Kirillova, Elena 2023-05-02T00:27:03Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/2596Revistahttp://seer.ucp.br/seer/index.php?journal=LexHumanaPUBhttp://seer.ucp.br/seer/index.php/LexHumana/oai||sergio.salles@ucp.br2175-09472175-0947opendoar:2023-05-02T00:27:03Lex Humana - Universidade Católica de Petrópolis (UCP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONCEITOS DE PERSONALIDADE JURÍDICA DA INTELIGÊNCIA ARTIFICIAL |
title |
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE |
spellingShingle |
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Sultonova, Laylo Artificial intelligence Computer and software technologies Robotics Legal personality Duty Legal relationship Subject Object |
title_short |
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE |
title_full |
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE |
title_fullStr |
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE |
title_full_unstemmed |
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE |
title_sort |
CONCEPTS OF LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE |
author |
Sultonova, Laylo |
author_facet |
Sultonova, Laylo Vasyukov, Vitalii Kirillova, Elena |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Vasyukov, Vitalii Kirillova, Elena |
author2_role |
author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Sultonova, Laylo Vasyukov, Vitalii Kirillova, Elena |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Artificial intelligence Computer and software technologies Robotics Legal personality Duty Legal relationship Subject Object |
topic |
Artificial intelligence Computer and software technologies Robotics Legal personality Duty Legal relationship Subject Object |
description |
The article is devoted to the concepts of the legal personality of artificial intelligence. The intensive development of AI technologies, which can autonomously make decisions and perform creative and intellectual tasks, raises the question of the need to determine AI's legal status. The main purpose of the study is to propose a concept of conditionally special legal personality that can be applied to certain types of AI. A multi-criteria analysis of works devoted to the development of concepts of the AI legal personality and documents of the judicial authorities of Australia, the UK, the USA, and France were carried out within the framework of the study. The study showed that there is no uniform systematic approach to determining the AI legal personality at the national and international levels. The study highlights the main software-synthesized abilities of some types of intelligence. It is concluded that AI can have a special legal personality only in the presence of certain software-synthesized abilities. Depending on their availability and volume, AI in some cases can be defined solely as a tool in the hands of a person and as an electronic subject of law in other hands. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-05-13 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://seer.ucp.br/seer/index.php/LexHumana/article/view/2596 |
url |
https://seer.ucp.br/seer/index.php/LexHumana/article/view/2596 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://seer.ucp.br/seer/index.php/LexHumana/article/view/2596/3532 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Lex Humana (ISSN 2175-0947) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Lex Humana (ISSN 2175-0947) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Petrópolis |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Católica de Petrópolis |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Lex Humana (ISSN 2175-0947); Vol. 15 No. 3 (2023): JUL-SEP; 283-295 Lex Humana (ISSN 2175-0947); v. 15 n. 3 (2023): JUL-SET; 283-295 2175-0947 reponame:Lex Humana instname:Universidade Católica de Petrópolis (UCP) instacron:UCP |
instname_str |
Universidade Católica de Petrópolis (UCP) |
instacron_str |
UCP |
institution |
UCP |
reponame_str |
Lex Humana |
collection |
Lex Humana |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Lex Humana - Universidade Católica de Petrópolis (UCP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||sergio.salles@ucp.br |
_version_ |
1809279387768455168 |