Intersection between electoral and party systems:: 2020 municipal elections Abstract

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Melo, Clóvis Alberto Vieira de
Data de Publicação: 2021
Outros Autores: Pessoa Júnior, José Raulino  Chaves , Soares, Kelly Cristina  Costa 
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Conhecer (Fortaleza)
Texto Completo: https://revistas.uece.br/index.php/revistaconhecer/article/view/4704
Resumo: This article analyzes the political impact of the electoral rules established by the Brazilian Constitutional Amendment No. 97/2017. Two changes in electoral governance are analyzed: a) prohibition of coalitions in the proportional election from the 2020 municipal elections on; and b) adoption of the party performance clause in the 2018 general elections. Two hypotheses are investigated: a) the first, related to party electoral performance, argues that these changes will negatively affect the electoral performance of the smaller parties and will benefit the bigger parties (this negative impact is greater on parties that have not reached the performance clause); and b) the second, related to party fragmentation, argues that there will be a decreased number of parties in city councils, rewarding bigger parties and penalizing mid- and small-sized parties. To test these hypotheses, electoral data from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral [TSE]) repository are compared in 2 elections: a) t0, when the change did not exist (2016 election); and b) t1, marked by the application of the 2 electoral rules (2020 elections). Data confirmed the 2 hypotheses formulated, showing that parties with more state-provided resources had a higher average performance and that party fragmentation was reduced.
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spelling Intersection between electoral and party systems:: 2020 municipal elections AbstractIntersección entre sistema electoral y sistema partidista:: elecciones municipales en 2020Intersection entre système électoral et système des partis:: élections municipales 2020Interseção entre Sistema Eleitoral e Sistema Partidário:: Eleições Municipais de 2020sistema eleitoralcoligação partidáriacláusula de desempenhoeleições municipaisfragmentação partidáriaelectoral systemparty coalitionperformance clausemunicipal electionsparty fragmentationsistema electoralcoalición partidistacláusula de rendimientoelecciones municipalesfragmentación partidistasystème électoralcoalition des partisclause de performanceélections municipalesfragmentation des partisThis article analyzes the political impact of the electoral rules established by the Brazilian Constitutional Amendment No. 97/2017. Two changes in electoral governance are analyzed: a) prohibition of coalitions in the proportional election from the 2020 municipal elections on; and b) adoption of the party performance clause in the 2018 general elections. Two hypotheses are investigated: a) the first, related to party electoral performance, argues that these changes will negatively affect the electoral performance of the smaller parties and will benefit the bigger parties (this negative impact is greater on parties that have not reached the performance clause); and b) the second, related to party fragmentation, argues that there will be a decreased number of parties in city councils, rewarding bigger parties and penalizing mid- and small-sized parties. To test these hypotheses, electoral data from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral [TSE]) repository are compared in 2 elections: a) t0, when the change did not exist (2016 election); and b) t1, marked by the application of the 2 electoral rules (2020 elections). Data confirmed the 2 hypotheses formulated, showing that parties with more state-provided resources had a higher average performance and that party fragmentation was reduced.Este artículo analiza el impacto político de las reglas electorales establecidas por la Enmienda Constitucional Brasileña No. 97/2017. Se analizan dos cambios en la gobernanza electoral: a) prohibición de coaliciones en la elección proporcional a partir de las elecciones municipales de 2020; y b) adopción de la cláusula de rendimiento de los partidos en las elecciones generales de 2018. Se investigan dos hipótesis: a) la primera, relacionada con el desempeño electoral de los partidos, sostiene que estos cambios afectarán negativamente el desempeño electoral de los partidos más pequeños y beneficiarán a los partidos más grandes (este impacto negativo será mayor en los partidos que no han alcanzado la cláusula de rendimiento); y b) la segunda, relacionada con la fragmentación partidista, sostiene que habrá una disminución del número de partidos en las cámaras municipales, premiando a los partidos más grandes y penalizando a los partidos medianos y pequeños. Para probar estas hipótesis, los datos electorales del repositorio del Tribunal Superior Electoral de Brasil (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral [TSE]) se comparan en 2 elecciones: a) t0, cuando el cambio no existía (elección de 2016); y b) t1, marcada por la aplicación de las 2 reglas electorales (elecciones de 2020). Los datos confirmaron las 2 hipótesis formuladas, mostrando que los partidos con más recursos proporcionados por el Estado tuvieron un desempeño promedio más alto y que la fragmentación partidista se ha reducido.Cet article analyse l’impact politique des règles électorales établies par l’Amendement Constitutionnel Brésilien No. 97/2017. Deux changements de gouvernance électorale sont analysés: a) interdiction des coalitions à l’élection proportionnelle à partir des élections municipales de 2020; et b) adoption de la clause de performance des partis aux élections générales de 2018. Deux hypothèses sont étudiées: a) la première, liée à la performance électorale des partis, soutient que ces changements affecteront négativement la performance électorale des petits partis et profiteront aux plus grands partis (cet impact négatif sera plus important sur les partis qui n’ont pas atteint la clause de performance); et b) la seconde, lié à la fragmentation des partis, soutient qu’il y aura une diminution du nombre des partis dans les conseils municipaux, récompensant les grands partis et pénalisant les petits et moyens partis. Pour tester ces hypothèses, les données électorales du référentiel de la Cour Supérieure Electorale Brésilienne (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral [TSE]) sont comparées dans 2 élections: a) t0, lorsque le changement n’existait pas (élection de 2016); et b) t1, marqué par l’application des 2 règles électorales (élections de 2020). Les données ont confirmé les 2 hypothèses formulées, montrant que les partis disposant de plus de ressources fournies par l'État avaient une performance moyenne plus élevée et que la fragmentation des partis a été réduite.Este artigo analisa o impacto político das regras eleitorais estabelecidas pela Emenda Constitucional n. 97/2017. Analisam-se 2 mudanças na governança eleitoral: a) proibição de coligações na disputa proporcional a partir das eleições municipais de 2020; e b) adoção da cláusula de desempenho dos partidos nas eleições gerais de 2018. Investigam-se 2 hipóteses: a) a primeira, relacionada ao desempenho eleitoral dos partidos, sustenta que essas alterações afetarão negativamente a performance eleitoral dos partidos menores e beneficiarão os maiores partidos (esse impacto negativo será maior em partidos que não atingiram a cláusula de desempenho); e b) a segunda, relacionada à fragmentação partidária, sustenta que haverá diminuição do número de partidos nas câmaras municipais, premiando partidos maiores e penalizando partidos médios e pequenos. Para testar essas hipóteses, comparam-se dados eleitorais do repositório do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) em 2 pleitos: a) t0, quando a alteração inexistia (eleição de 2016); e b) t1, marcado pela aplicação das 2 regras eleitorais (eleições de 2020). Os dados confirmaram as 2 hipóteses assumidas, mostrando que partidos com mais recursos estatais apresentaram desempenho médio maior e que a fragmentação partidária foi reduzida. EdUECE2021-01-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistas.uece.br/index.php/revistaconhecer/article/view/470410.32335/2238-0426.2021.11.26.4704Conhecer: debate entre o público e o privado; v. 11 n. 26 (2021); 227-2642238-0426reponame:Conhecer (Fortaleza)instname:Universidade Estadual do Ceará (UECE)instacron:UECEporhttps://revistas.uece.br/index.php/revistaconhecer/article/view/4704/3887Copyright (c) 2021 Conhecer: debate entre o público e o privadoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMelo, Clóvis Alberto Vieira dePessoa Júnior, José Raulino  Chaves Soares, Kelly Cristina  Costa 2021-02-01T19:30:14Zoai:ojs.revistas.uece.br:article/4704Revistahttps://revistas.uece.br/index.php/revistaconhecer/indexPUBhttps://revistas.uece.br/index.php/revistaconhecer/oaifhsfgm@gmail.com||revistaconhecer@uece.br2238-04262238-0426opendoar:2021-02-01T19:30:14Conhecer (Fortaleza) - Universidade Estadual do Ceará (UECE)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Intersection between electoral and party systems:: 2020 municipal elections Abstract
Intersección entre sistema electoral y sistema partidista:: elecciones municipales en 2020
Intersection entre système électoral et système des partis:: élections municipales 2020
Interseção entre Sistema Eleitoral e Sistema Partidário:: Eleições Municipais de 2020
title Intersection between electoral and party systems:: 2020 municipal elections Abstract
spellingShingle Intersection between electoral and party systems:: 2020 municipal elections Abstract
Melo, Clóvis Alberto Vieira de
sistema eleitoral
coligação partidária
cláusula de desempenho
eleições municipais
fragmentação partidária
electoral system
party coalition
performance clause
municipal elections
party fragmentation
sistema electoral
coalición partidista
cláusula de rendimiento
elecciones municipales
fragmentación partidista
système électoral
coalition des partis
clause de performance
élections municipales
fragmentation des partis
title_short Intersection between electoral and party systems:: 2020 municipal elections Abstract
title_full Intersection between electoral and party systems:: 2020 municipal elections Abstract
title_fullStr Intersection between electoral and party systems:: 2020 municipal elections Abstract
title_full_unstemmed Intersection between electoral and party systems:: 2020 municipal elections Abstract
title_sort Intersection between electoral and party systems:: 2020 municipal elections Abstract
author Melo, Clóvis Alberto Vieira de
author_facet Melo, Clóvis Alberto Vieira de
Pessoa Júnior, José Raulino  Chaves 
Soares, Kelly Cristina  Costa 
author_role author
author2 Pessoa Júnior, José Raulino  Chaves 
Soares, Kelly Cristina  Costa 
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Melo, Clóvis Alberto Vieira de
Pessoa Júnior, José Raulino  Chaves 
Soares, Kelly Cristina  Costa 
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv sistema eleitoral
coligação partidária
cláusula de desempenho
eleições municipais
fragmentação partidária
electoral system
party coalition
performance clause
municipal elections
party fragmentation
sistema electoral
coalición partidista
cláusula de rendimiento
elecciones municipales
fragmentación partidista
système électoral
coalition des partis
clause de performance
élections municipales
fragmentation des partis
topic sistema eleitoral
coligação partidária
cláusula de desempenho
eleições municipais
fragmentação partidária
electoral system
party coalition
performance clause
municipal elections
party fragmentation
sistema electoral
coalición partidista
cláusula de rendimiento
elecciones municipales
fragmentación partidista
système électoral
coalition des partis
clause de performance
élections municipales
fragmentation des partis
description This article analyzes the political impact of the electoral rules established by the Brazilian Constitutional Amendment No. 97/2017. Two changes in electoral governance are analyzed: a) prohibition of coalitions in the proportional election from the 2020 municipal elections on; and b) adoption of the party performance clause in the 2018 general elections. Two hypotheses are investigated: a) the first, related to party electoral performance, argues that these changes will negatively affect the electoral performance of the smaller parties and will benefit the bigger parties (this negative impact is greater on parties that have not reached the performance clause); and b) the second, related to party fragmentation, argues that there will be a decreased number of parties in city councils, rewarding bigger parties and penalizing mid- and small-sized parties. To test these hypotheses, electoral data from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral [TSE]) repository are compared in 2 elections: a) t0, when the change did not exist (2016 election); and b) t1, marked by the application of the 2 electoral rules (2020 elections). Data confirmed the 2 hypotheses formulated, showing that parties with more state-provided resources had a higher average performance and that party fragmentation was reduced.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-01-09
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistas.uece.br/index.php/revistaconhecer/article/view/4704
10.32335/2238-0426.2021.11.26.4704
url https://revistas.uece.br/index.php/revistaconhecer/article/view/4704
identifier_str_mv 10.32335/2238-0426.2021.11.26.4704
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.uece.br/index.php/revistaconhecer/article/view/4704/3887
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Conhecer: debate entre o público e o privado
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Conhecer: debate entre o público e o privado
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv EdUECE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv EdUECE
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Conhecer: debate entre o público e o privado; v. 11 n. 26 (2021); 227-264
2238-0426
reponame:Conhecer (Fortaleza)
instname:Universidade Estadual do Ceará (UECE)
instacron:UECE
instname_str Universidade Estadual do Ceará (UECE)
instacron_str UECE
institution UECE
reponame_str Conhecer (Fortaleza)
collection Conhecer (Fortaleza)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Conhecer (Fortaleza) - Universidade Estadual do Ceará (UECE)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv fhsfgm@gmail.com||revistaconhecer@uece.br
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