A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreements

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Mendes, Dany Rafael Fonseca
Data de Publicação: 2018
Outros Autores: Constantino, Michel, Herrera, Gabriel Paes
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista do Direito Público
Texto Completo: https://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/direitopub/article/view/28859
Resumo: This study, as a whole, assumes the social benefits of market competition, where unethical behavior, such as illegal agreements between market competitors (i.e. cartels), causes problems for the global system of free markets. Because of this socially undesirable conduct, countries have different leniency programs, which idealize solutions that are gaining strength in the fight against cartels worldwide. Moreover, this paper explores the logic behind leniency agreements in the elaboration of amnesty agreements. Furthermore, this study tackles another fundamental problem: the excess of jurisdictions in leniency agreements – which, at the global level, restricts the global system of free market defense. With this problem in mind, this research proposes a solution for the excess of jurisdictions and investigates another approach: a proposal of a "one-stop shop for the first bells", that is, a global system of distribution of unified passwords for leniency agreements that may involve a number of countries.
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spelling A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreementsBalcão único para os 'primeiros a tocar o sino' em acordos globais de leniênciaCompetitionCartelsLenience agreementsMarkersOne-stop shop.ConcorrênciaCartéisAcordos de LeniênciaSenhasBalcão ÚnicoThis study, as a whole, assumes the social benefits of market competition, where unethical behavior, such as illegal agreements between market competitors (i.e. cartels), causes problems for the global system of free markets. Because of this socially undesirable conduct, countries have different leniency programs, which idealize solutions that are gaining strength in the fight against cartels worldwide. Moreover, this paper explores the logic behind leniency agreements in the elaboration of amnesty agreements. Furthermore, this study tackles another fundamental problem: the excess of jurisdictions in leniency agreements – which, at the global level, restricts the global system of free market defense. With this problem in mind, this research proposes a solution for the excess of jurisdictions and investigates another approach: a proposal of a "one-stop shop for the first bells", that is, a global system of distribution of unified passwords for leniency agreements that may involve a number of countries.Neste trabalho, assumindo os benefícios sociais relativos à defesa da concorrência, serão inicialmente expostos os problemas causados pela conduta de acordos ilegais entre “concorrentes” de mercado (cartéis). Em consequência dessa conduta socialmente indesejada, o tratamento destinado por diferentes países em programas de leniência será apresentado, incluindo-se, nesses programas, uma solução que vem ganhando força no combate aos cartéis mundo afora: a senha para o primeiro denunciante. Mais à frente, após a explicação da lógica que, na elaboração desses acordos de anistia, há por trás da leniência, o presente estudo cuidará de seu problema fundamental, ou seja, o excesso de jurisdições para acordos de leniência – que, em âmbito mundial, gera ineficiências ao sistema de defesa da concorrência. Como uma possível solução para esse excesso de jurisdições cuidando dos mesmos acordos, esta pesquisa abordará a proposta de um “balcão único para os primeiros a tocar o sino”, ou seja, a sugestão de se criar um sistema global de distribuição de senhas unificadas para acordos de leniência que, porventura, envolvam diversos países.Universidade Estadual de Londrina2018-12-23info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtigo avaliado pelos Paresapplication/pdfhttps://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/direitopub/article/view/2885910.5433/1980-511X.2018v13n3p41Revista do Direito Público; v. 13 n. 3 (2018); 41-551980-511Xreponame:Revista do Direito Públicoinstname:Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL)instacron:UELporhttps://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/direitopub/article/view/28859/24715Copyright (c) 2018 Revista do Direito Públicoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMendes, Dany Rafael FonsecaConstantino, MichelHerrera, Gabriel Paes2019-07-03T14:43:39Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/28859Revistahttps://www.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/direitopubPUBhttps://www.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/direitopub/oai||rdpubuel@uel.br1980-511X1980-511Xopendoar:2019-07-03T14:43:39Revista do Direito Público - Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreements
Balcão único para os 'primeiros a tocar o sino' em acordos globais de leniência
title A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreements
spellingShingle A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreements
Mendes, Dany Rafael Fonseca
Competition
Cartels
Lenience agreements
Markers
One-stop shop.
Concorrência
Cartéis
Acordos de Leniência
Senhas
Balcão Único
title_short A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreements
title_full A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreements
title_fullStr A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreements
title_full_unstemmed A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreements
title_sort A single balcony for those who 'first touch the bell' in global lenience agreements
author Mendes, Dany Rafael Fonseca
author_facet Mendes, Dany Rafael Fonseca
Constantino, Michel
Herrera, Gabriel Paes
author_role author
author2 Constantino, Michel
Herrera, Gabriel Paes
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Mendes, Dany Rafael Fonseca
Constantino, Michel
Herrera, Gabriel Paes
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Competition
Cartels
Lenience agreements
Markers
One-stop shop.
Concorrência
Cartéis
Acordos de Leniência
Senhas
Balcão Único
topic Competition
Cartels
Lenience agreements
Markers
One-stop shop.
Concorrência
Cartéis
Acordos de Leniência
Senhas
Balcão Único
description This study, as a whole, assumes the social benefits of market competition, where unethical behavior, such as illegal agreements between market competitors (i.e. cartels), causes problems for the global system of free markets. Because of this socially undesirable conduct, countries have different leniency programs, which idealize solutions that are gaining strength in the fight against cartels worldwide. Moreover, this paper explores the logic behind leniency agreements in the elaboration of amnesty agreements. Furthermore, this study tackles another fundamental problem: the excess of jurisdictions in leniency agreements – which, at the global level, restricts the global system of free market defense. With this problem in mind, this research proposes a solution for the excess of jurisdictions and investigates another approach: a proposal of a "one-stop shop for the first bells", that is, a global system of distribution of unified passwords for leniency agreements that may involve a number of countries.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-12-23
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Artigo avaliado pelos Pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/direitopub/article/view/28859
10.5433/1980-511X.2018v13n3p41
url https://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/direitopub/article/view/28859
identifier_str_mv 10.5433/1980-511X.2018v13n3p41
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://ojs.uel.br/revistas/uel/index.php/direitopub/article/view/28859/24715
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Revista do Direito Público
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2018 Revista do Direito Público
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Londrina
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Londrina
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista do Direito Público; v. 13 n. 3 (2018); 41-55
1980-511X
reponame:Revista do Direito Público
instname:Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL)
instacron:UEL
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL)
instacron_str UEL
institution UEL
reponame_str Revista do Direito Público
collection Revista do Direito Público
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista do Direito Público - Universidade Estadual de Londrina (UEL)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||rdpubuel@uel.br
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