Um exame da leitura realista das nocões humeanas de existência externa e causalidade

• Autor(a) principal: Santos, Wesley Ribeiro Ferreira dos
• Data de Publicação: 2017
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da Universidade Estadual de Maringá (RI-UEM)
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.uem.br:8080/jspui/handle/1/2756
• topic: Realismo; Teoria do conhecimento., Causalidade; David Hume; Existência externa; Brasil.; David Hume; Realism; External existence; Causality; Brazil.; Ciências Humanas; Filosofia

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the notions of external existence and causality in the light of the debate on the "New Hume" and to confront neo- Humean reading with what we can discover within the philosopher's own texts. We want to understand not only how it is possible to attribute sceptical realism regarding causal relations and the existence of objects external to the mind to Hume, specifically, what allows us to see this "New Hume" in the text of the main philosophical works of the Scottish thinker, but also to gain an evaluation of this new reading of his work. To achieve our objective, we have established, in the first chapter, a characterization of the debate in question. From this characterization, we draw up a map of the problems that make up the debate. The points that we raise in our first chapter will serve to question Hume's texts and also those of his commentators. The second chapter focuses on the discussion of the notion of external existence and causality from the point of view of Galen Strawson, a realistic interpreter of Hume's philosophy. In the third and fourth chapters, Hume's texts of are examined, taking into account the discussion from the previous chapters. The third chapter examines the theory of ideas and the notion of external existence, while the fourth chapter examines the idea of causality. For the reading of Hume's texts, we will adopt the following procedure: we will always start from the consideration of the An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding for the Treatise, following, in this way, the orientation of Galen Strawson (2000). We will maintain throughout this dissertation that it is not possible to attribute a sceptical realism to Hume because, although we can admit a certain kind of intelligibility to the realist notions under examination, their intelligibility does not guarantee an epistemic character to them and, in addition, Hume's notion of external existence is not a realistic notion.