Performance criterion: from behaviorism to functionalism

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Vicentini, Max Rogério
Data de Publicação: 2008
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)
Texto Completo: http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/2790
Resumo: The aim of this article is to investigate the origins, range and limitations of functionalism. At first the historical roots of mind philosophy with special regard to relevant aspects of Descartes’ writing will be studied. Based on the subjectivist concept of mind as advocated by Descartes the structure of the theories dealing scientifically with the mind will be analyzed giving special emphasis to the behaviorist ideas and to their influence on the delimitations of the field of mental studies, including the causes of their failure. And as a consequence it will be verified how functionalism, which intends to be an alternative answer to the question of the mind’s nature, overcomes or relapses into the same problems that invalidated behaviorism. This criticism of functionalism is based on qualia notion that constitutes an impediment to the reductionist claims of current mind theories.
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spelling Performance criterion: from behaviorism to functionalismO critério de desempenho: do behaviorismo ao funcionalismomentefuncionalismobehaviorismomaterialismoThe aim of this article is to investigate the origins, range and limitations of functionalism. At first the historical roots of mind philosophy with special regard to relevant aspects of Descartes’ writing will be studied. Based on the subjectivist concept of mind as advocated by Descartes the structure of the theories dealing scientifically with the mind will be analyzed giving special emphasis to the behaviorist ideas and to their influence on the delimitations of the field of mental studies, including the causes of their failure. And as a consequence it will be verified how functionalism, which intends to be an alternative answer to the question of the mind’s nature, overcomes or relapses into the same problems that invalidated behaviorism. This criticism of functionalism is based on qualia notion that constitutes an impediment to the reductionist claims of current mind theories.Pretende-se, aqui, investigar as origens, alcance e limitações do funcionalismo. Busca-se, em um primeiro momento, as raízes históricas da filosofia da mente dirigindo a atenção a aspectos relevantes da obra cartesiana. De posse da concepção subjetivista de mente, defendida por Descartes, analisa-se a estruturação das teorias que procuram abordar cientificamente o mental. Deter-se-á, particularmente, na consideração das idéias behavioristas e no impacto que elas tiveram na delimitação de um campo de estudo próprio do mental, analisando as causas de seu insucesso. Como decorrência, apura-se de que maneira o funcionalismo, que pretende ser uma resposta alternativa à pergunta pela natureza do mental, supera ou recai nos mesmos problemas que invalidaram o behaviorismo. Essas críticas ao funcionalismo serão baseadas na noção de qualia, que surge como um empecilho às pretensões reducionistas das teorias da mente atuais.Universidade Estadual De Maringá2008-05-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/279010.4025/actascihumansoc.v23i0.2790Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; Vol 23 (2001); 223-230Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; v. 23 (2001); 223-2301807-86561679-7361reponame:Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)instacron:UEMporhttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/2790/1903Vicentini, Max Rogérioinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-11-23T17:35:26Zoai:periodicos.uem.br/ojs:article/2790Revistahttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/indexPUBhttp://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/oai||actahuman@uem.br1807-86561679-7361opendoar:2022-11-23T17:35:26Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Performance criterion: from behaviorism to functionalism
O critério de desempenho: do behaviorismo ao funcionalismo
title Performance criterion: from behaviorism to functionalism
spellingShingle Performance criterion: from behaviorism to functionalism
Vicentini, Max Rogério
mente
funcionalismo
behaviorismo
materialismo
title_short Performance criterion: from behaviorism to functionalism
title_full Performance criterion: from behaviorism to functionalism
title_fullStr Performance criterion: from behaviorism to functionalism
title_full_unstemmed Performance criterion: from behaviorism to functionalism
title_sort Performance criterion: from behaviorism to functionalism
author Vicentini, Max Rogério
author_facet Vicentini, Max Rogério
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Vicentini, Max Rogério
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv mente
funcionalismo
behaviorismo
materialismo
topic mente
funcionalismo
behaviorismo
materialismo
description The aim of this article is to investigate the origins, range and limitations of functionalism. At first the historical roots of mind philosophy with special regard to relevant aspects of Descartes’ writing will be studied. Based on the subjectivist concept of mind as advocated by Descartes the structure of the theories dealing scientifically with the mind will be analyzed giving special emphasis to the behaviorist ideas and to their influence on the delimitations of the field of mental studies, including the causes of their failure. And as a consequence it will be verified how functionalism, which intends to be an alternative answer to the question of the mind’s nature, overcomes or relapses into the same problems that invalidated behaviorism. This criticism of functionalism is based on qualia notion that constitutes an impediment to the reductionist claims of current mind theories.
publishDate 2008
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2008-05-06
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/2790
10.4025/actascihumansoc.v23i0.2790
url http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/2790
identifier_str_mv 10.4025/actascihumansoc.v23i0.2790
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciHumanSocSci/article/view/2790/1903
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual De Maringá
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual De Maringá
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; Vol 23 (2001); 223-230
Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences; v. 23 (2001); 223-230
1807-8656
1679-7361
reponame:Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)
instacron:UEM
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)
instacron_str UEM
institution UEM
reponame_str Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)
collection Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||actahuman@uem.br
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