Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentária
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2002 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582002000200005 |
Resumo: | This article challenges the interpretations concerning participation by Brazilian legislators in the budget process focused on incentives generated by the electoral legislation. We show that the rules and regulations governing the budget process affect the distribution of funds both between branches of government and within the legislative branch itself. Constitutional and legal rules preserve the original proposal submitted by the Executive. Within Congress, the bylaws favor collective participation of members, for example, by way of submission of amendments by State representations. We further show that participation by the legislative branch in the budget process can only be understood when the political parties are taken into account. Coordination of efforts by the political parties thus ends up grouping them in two major blocs, pro-administration and opposition. In other words, partisan participation in the budget process depends on the parties relations with the Executive. Thus, the strategy adopted by the majority supporting the Executive takes into account their contribution to the success of policies sponsored by the administration of which they are a part. |
id |
UERJ-23_c1f57138f5607e8edbe3452e82fffd1f |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:scielo:S0011-52582002000200005 |
network_acronym_str |
UERJ-23 |
network_name_str |
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentáriabudget policypartieselectoral legislationThis article challenges the interpretations concerning participation by Brazilian legislators in the budget process focused on incentives generated by the electoral legislation. We show that the rules and regulations governing the budget process affect the distribution of funds both between branches of government and within the legislative branch itself. Constitutional and legal rules preserve the original proposal submitted by the Executive. Within Congress, the bylaws favor collective participation of members, for example, by way of submission of amendments by State representations. We further show that participation by the legislative branch in the budget process can only be understood when the political parties are taken into account. Coordination of efforts by the political parties thus ends up grouping them in two major blocs, pro-administration and opposition. In other words, partisan participation in the budget process depends on the parties relations with the Executive. Thus, the strategy adopted by the majority supporting the Executive takes into account their contribution to the success of policies sponsored by the administration of which they are a part.Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)2002-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582002000200005Dados v.45 n.2 2002reponame:Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociaisinstname:Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)instacron:UERJ10.1590/S0011-52582002000200005info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFigueiredo,Argelina CheibubLimongi,Fernandopor2002-08-13T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0011-52582002000200005Revistahttp://dados.iesp.uerj.br/PUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||dados@iesp.uerj.br1678-45880011-5258opendoar:2002-08-13T00:00Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais - Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentária |
title |
Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentária |
spellingShingle |
Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentária Figueiredo,Argelina Cheibub budget policy parties electoral legislation |
title_short |
Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentária |
title_full |
Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentária |
title_fullStr |
Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentária |
title_full_unstemmed |
Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentária |
title_sort |
Incentivos Eleitorais, Partidos e Política Orçamentária |
author |
Figueiredo,Argelina Cheibub |
author_facet |
Figueiredo,Argelina Cheibub Limongi,Fernando |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Limongi,Fernando |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Figueiredo,Argelina Cheibub Limongi,Fernando |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
budget policy parties electoral legislation |
topic |
budget policy parties electoral legislation |
description |
This article challenges the interpretations concerning participation by Brazilian legislators in the budget process focused on incentives generated by the electoral legislation. We show that the rules and regulations governing the budget process affect the distribution of funds both between branches of government and within the legislative branch itself. Constitutional and legal rules preserve the original proposal submitted by the Executive. Within Congress, the bylaws favor collective participation of members, for example, by way of submission of amendments by State representations. We further show that participation by the legislative branch in the budget process can only be understood when the political parties are taken into account. Coordination of efforts by the political parties thus ends up grouping them in two major blocs, pro-administration and opposition. In other words, partisan participation in the budget process depends on the parties relations with the Executive. Thus, the strategy adopted by the majority supporting the Executive takes into account their contribution to the success of policies sponsored by the administration of which they are a part. |
publishDate |
2002 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2002-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582002000200005 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582002000200005 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/S0011-52582002000200005 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Dados v.45 n.2 2002 reponame:Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais instname:Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) instacron:UERJ |
instname_str |
Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
instacron_str |
UERJ |
institution |
UERJ |
reponame_str |
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais |
collection |
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais - Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||dados@iesp.uerj.br |
_version_ |
1750312647831584768 |