O endividamento dos Estados-membros em face da União: uma distorção grave e suas consequências para o federalismo fiscal brasileiro

• Autor(a) principal: Martins, Andrea Siqueira
• Data de Publicação: 2020
• Outros Autores: [e-mail]
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UERJ
• Texto Completo: http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/handle/1/18905
• topic: Fiscal federalism; Public debt; Indebtedness of subnational entities; Equalization mechanisms; North American dual federalism; German cooperative federalism; Evolution of Brazilian federalism; Macroeconomic policy; Fiscal war; Socialization of losses; Too big to fail; Bailout game; Federalismo fiscal; Endividamento público; Endividamento dos entes subnacionais; Mecanismos de equalização; Federalismo dual norte-americano; Federalismo cooperativo alemão; Evolução do federalismo brasileiro; Política macroeconômica; Guerra fiscal; Socialização dos prejuízos; Grande demais para falir (Too big to fail); Jogo de resgate (bailout game); CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::DIREITO::DIREITO PUBLICO::DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL

The indebtedness of subnational entities is one of the themes of the study of fiscal federalism, because its cause is directly linked to the need to match revenue and the application of public spending. Through equalization mechanisms, it seeks to balance the asymmetries of the different federative models. Brazilian federalism, in its origin, adopted the dual system, with the respective evolution to a cooperative-type federalism, which is why the study will cover the North American and German cases. In addition to the analysis of their particularities, the criteria and the ways in which intergovernmental transfers are carried out and how the problem of the indebtedness of subnational entities in both countries are dealt with will be investigated, in order to compare them with the Brazilian example. The study also includes the general aspects of public indebtedness and its consequences for the issue of equity between generations. Asymmetries caused by Member States' indebtedness will be pointed out on a case-by-case basis, with their respective implications for the national federal system. Finally, based on the theory of the bailout game, the behavior of several actors in the game will be analyzed, which includes not only the federal entities, but also the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Powers, in addition to several others control bodies. Emphasis will be given to the role of the Supreme Federal Tribunal, which, as the federation's court, should encourage the interaction of all other actors involved in the game of Brazilian federalism.