Variações leibnizianas

• Autor(a) principal: Maia, Caetano Torelli de Mello
• Data de Publicação: 2021
• Outros Autores: [e-mail]
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UERJ
• Texto Completo: http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/handle/1/16850
• topic: Invariants; Philosophy, German; Descartes, René, 1596-1650; Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716; Filosofia alemã; Invariantes; CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA::EPISTEMOLOGIA

When a philosophy begins, it starts from a field in profusion, without ready coordinates, full of infinite variations, on which it will project a plan, draw an orientation, a specific distribution. Every philosophy begins where there is still no philosophy of the cogito, of the fixed point, of the individual, of any term that would paralyze a discourse within an established limit, in an inviolable territory, in a center. Every philosophy begins in a multiplicity, in an impassive difference, and every beginning says practically everything about how a philosopher thinks about that multiplicity and how he configures that difference. At the outset, there are at least two ways for a philosopher to start: 1) or, like Descartes, the space of variations is rejected in the name of a fixed invariant, of a first condition of experience, of a fundamental, original and unshakable point around which every movement of thought must rotate, in relation to which everything must be judged in the image and likeness. In this scenario, all distribution, all separation from what matters and does not matter, from what guides the spirit, goes in only one direction and prevents the multiplicity from rising, since it is the center of meaning, the invariant that commands the action, that prejudices, that determines a group of variations, of multiplicities as capable of being represented or thought, the difference always being at the service of a previous identity, of an absolute reference of intelligibility; 2) or think, as Leibniz, from the variations themselves, from the multiplicities in their capacity to generate meaning regardless of the absolute fixed point, because, in this case, it is the variation itself that produces the similarity, the identity, is the difference itself which establishes points of stops as infinitely small movements, which finds moments of fixity and relative invariance. In this horizon, the foundation, the centers, the invariants are not first, they are not references without which no sense would be possible, on the contrary, every point, every term is secondary, product or effect of a distribution, of a field in variation, of a real (not possible) experience of differences. When Leibniz starts he always postpones the beginning, explores a field of diverse multiplicities (the set of monads, micro-perceptions, nuanced gradations of ideas in the understanding, etc.), pluralizes points of view, makes relations, expressions between them and transfers the origin to the icnographic plane, to the point to infinity as a collection of all points of reference, of all scenographies, not as the absolute reference. Leibniz - in criticizing the Cartesian method, which is based on the need for the absolute invariant to think about variations - is precisely one of the great attempts to produce a thought that refuses to judge multiplicity or difference in the name of the previous identity, from a point absolute fixed, a limit of the thinkable or the experience. Thus, in the spirit of Leibniz's philosophy, this work seeks to design the network, the plan, the distributions of the Leibnizian world, or rather, it seeks to announce the multiplicity liberated from the primacy of the fixed point according to the features of Leibnizian variations.