Determinantes do sucesso legislativo parlamentar na Câmara de Deputados do Brasil

• Autor(a) principal: Darrieux, Rodolfo Scotelaro Porto
• Data de Publicação: 2020
• Outros Autores: [e-mail]
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UERJ
• Texto Completo: http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/handle/1/16977
• topic: Power-seeking; Legislative success; Institutions; Institutions. Parties; Sucesso legislativo; Instituições; Partidos; Poder legislativo; Sucesso; Partidos políticos; Brasil. Congresso. Câmara dos Deputados; CIENCIAS HUMANAS::CIENCIA POLITICA

This thesis aims to analyze the determinants of the legislative success of Brazilian federal deputies. More precisely, it seeks to answer the following questions: what are the deputies' incentives to make proposals? Who are the legislatively legislators? What political and institutional factors assist them in legislative bargaining? Using the concept of power-seeking (Dodd, 1977), it is argued that deputies seek to approve bills to reinforce and increase their political influence within the legislature because the approval of a proposition is a scarce resource. This phenomenon was observed showing that deputies of the "high clergy" (alto clero), that is, with more time in the House, besides a history of occupying positions such as rapporteur (relator) and / or chair of commissions, party leadership, ministry and / or chair of the Board of Directors (Mesa Diretora) are more successful than deputies of the "low clergy" (baixo clero) for not having held positions of power. In addition, it was noticed that institutional factors such as urgency procedure, the use of conclusive power and projects of political-institutional, honorary, social and of diffuse law themes favor the legislative success of the power-seeking deputy. It was observed that circumstantial issues also matter in the legislative success when verifying that deputies have more chances of success in the last two years of a Legislature. In addition, it was also found that political parties also facilitate the legislative bargaining of power-seeking deputies through negotiations via the parliamentary bloc in the distribution of gatekeeping posts. It was also found that parties characterized as "big" for owing more resources inside and outside the Legislative Power help the power-seeking deputy in the legislative bargain. It was also seen that power-seeking deputies from left-wing parties are more likely to succeed than those from the center and right-wing parties. Finally, it was found that membership in the president's party or in the governing coalition does not matter in the legislative success of deputies.