Existe um conceito de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Trilhas Filosóficas (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.apps.uern.br/index.php/RTF/article/view/5524 |
Resumo: | The concept of subject of law is fundamental to the legal relationship in the Theory of Law. The subject is the personification of objectively assigned norms. Philosophical analysis allows you to reach its theoretical-methodological foundations. For Kant, the subject has a relationship with reason, autonomy and morality. The distinction between law and morals is deepened, but without breaking the categories. Marx describe the legal relationship based on formal equality between abstract subjects. Law consists in the application of an equal measure, but concrete individuals are unequal. The law would not have to be equal, but unequal. The object of work is the notion of subject of law in Kant and Marx. The problem is whether there is a concept of subject of law for the authors that is distinct from the moral subject. The hypothesis is that the authors present an understanding of the subject of law and its relationship with morality in different ways. Bibliographical research is carried out, especially Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right, in the work Metaphysics of Morals, by Kant, and For the Jewish Question and Critique of the Gotha Program, by Marx. It is concluded that in Kant, there is no autonomous subject of law, but an intertwined relationship between the moral subject and the subject of law. Marx understands the notion of subject of law in its specific form, distinct from morality, as a typical relationship of capitalism. However, the subject of law presents itself as an abstract form, the figure of the bourgeois individual. |
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Existe um conceito de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx?Subject of lawMoralityKantMarxSujeito de direitoMoralKantMarxThe concept of subject of law is fundamental to the legal relationship in the Theory of Law. The subject is the personification of objectively assigned norms. Philosophical analysis allows you to reach its theoretical-methodological foundations. For Kant, the subject has a relationship with reason, autonomy and morality. The distinction between law and morals is deepened, but without breaking the categories. Marx describe the legal relationship based on formal equality between abstract subjects. Law consists in the application of an equal measure, but concrete individuals are unequal. The law would not have to be equal, but unequal. The object of work is the notion of subject of law in Kant and Marx. The problem is whether there is a concept of subject of law for the authors that is distinct from the moral subject. The hypothesis is that the authors present an understanding of the subject of law and its relationship with morality in different ways. Bibliographical research is carried out, especially Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right, in the work Metaphysics of Morals, by Kant, and For the Jewish Question and Critique of the Gotha Program, by Marx. It is concluded that in Kant, there is no autonomous subject of law, but an intertwined relationship between the moral subject and the subject of law. Marx understands the notion of subject of law in its specific form, distinct from morality, as a typical relationship of capitalism. However, the subject of law presents itself as an abstract form, the figure of the bourgeois individual.O conceito de sujeito de direito é basilar da relação jurídica na Teoria do Direito. O sujeito é a personificação de normas atribuídas objetivamente. A análise filosófica permite alcançar seus fundamentos teórico-metodológicos. Para Kant, o sujeito possui relação com razão, autonomia e moral. A distinção entre direito e moral é aprofundada, mas sem o rompimento das categorias. Marx descrever a relação jurídica fundada na igualdade formal entre sujeitos abstratos. O direito se consisti na aplicação de uma medida igual, mas os indivíduos concretos são desiguais. O direito não teria que ser igual, mas desigual. O objeto do trabalho é a noção de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx. O problema é se existe um conceito de sujeito de direito para os autores que seja distinto do sujeito moral. A hipótese é que os autores apresentam compreensão sobre o sujeito de direito e sua relação com a moral de formas distintas. Realiza-se pesquisa bibliográfica, especialmente Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes, Doutrina do direito, na obra Metafísica dos costumes, de Kant, e Para a questão judaica e Crítica ao programa de Gotha, de Marx. Conclui-se que em Kant, não há um sujeito de direito autônoma, mas uma relação imbricada entre sujeito moral e sujeito de direito. Marx compreende a noção de sujeito de direito em sua forma específica, distinta da moral, como relação típica do capitalismo. Porém, o sujeito de direito apresenta-se como forma abstrata, a figura do indivíduo burguês.Universidade do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte - UERN2023-11-13info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.apps.uern.br/index.php/RTF/article/view/552410.25244/tf.v16i1.5524Trilhas Filosóficas; v. 16 n. 1 (2023): Trilhas Filosóficas: Dossiê Ética e Cidadania (v.16, n.1, 2023); 125-1411984-556110.25244/tf.v16i1reponame:Trilhas Filosóficas (Online)instname:Universidade do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte (UERN)instacron:UERNporhttps://periodicos.apps.uern.br/index.php/RTF/article/view/5524/3979Copyright (c) 2023 Francisco Cláudio Oliveira Silva Filhohttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilva Filho, Francisco Cláudio Oliveira 2023-11-29T14:27:54Zoai:ojs2.periodicos.apps.uern.br:article/5524Revistahttp://periodicos.apps.uern.br/index.php/RTF/indexPUBhttp://periodicos.apps.uern.br/index.php/RTF/oaitrilhasfilosoficas@uern.br || marcos_erico@yahoo.com.br10.25244/tf1984-55611982-7490opendoar:2023-11-29T14:27:54Trilhas Filosóficas (Online) - Universidade do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte (UERN)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Existe um conceito de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx? |
title |
Existe um conceito de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx? |
spellingShingle |
Existe um conceito de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx? Silva Filho, Francisco Cláudio Oliveira Subject of law Morality Kant Marx Sujeito de direito Moral Kant Marx |
title_short |
Existe um conceito de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx? |
title_full |
Existe um conceito de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx? |
title_fullStr |
Existe um conceito de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Existe um conceito de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx? |
title_sort |
Existe um conceito de sujeito de direito em Kant e em Marx? |
author |
Silva Filho, Francisco Cláudio Oliveira |
author_facet |
Silva Filho, Francisco Cláudio Oliveira |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Silva Filho, Francisco Cláudio Oliveira |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Subject of law Morality Kant Marx Sujeito de direito Moral Kant Marx |
topic |
Subject of law Morality Kant Marx Sujeito de direito Moral Kant Marx |
description |
The concept of subject of law is fundamental to the legal relationship in the Theory of Law. The subject is the personification of objectively assigned norms. Philosophical analysis allows you to reach its theoretical-methodological foundations. For Kant, the subject has a relationship with reason, autonomy and morality. The distinction between law and morals is deepened, but without breaking the categories. Marx describe the legal relationship based on formal equality between abstract subjects. Law consists in the application of an equal measure, but concrete individuals are unequal. The law would not have to be equal, but unequal. The object of work is the notion of subject of law in Kant and Marx. The problem is whether there is a concept of subject of law for the authors that is distinct from the moral subject. The hypothesis is that the authors present an understanding of the subject of law and its relationship with morality in different ways. Bibliographical research is carried out, especially Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Right, in the work Metaphysics of Morals, by Kant, and For the Jewish Question and Critique of the Gotha Program, by Marx. It is concluded that in Kant, there is no autonomous subject of law, but an intertwined relationship between the moral subject and the subject of law. Marx understands the notion of subject of law in its specific form, distinct from morality, as a typical relationship of capitalism. However, the subject of law presents itself as an abstract form, the figure of the bourgeois individual. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-11-13 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.apps.uern.br/index.php/RTF/article/view/5524 10.25244/tf.v16i1.5524 |
url |
https://periodicos.apps.uern.br/index.php/RTF/article/view/5524 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.25244/tf.v16i1.5524 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.apps.uern.br/index.php/RTF/article/view/5524/3979 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Francisco Cláudio Oliveira Silva Filho https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Francisco Cláudio Oliveira Silva Filho https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte - UERN |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte - UERN |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Trilhas Filosóficas; v. 16 n. 1 (2023): Trilhas Filosóficas: Dossiê Ética e Cidadania (v.16, n.1, 2023); 125-141 1984-5561 10.25244/tf.v16i1 reponame:Trilhas Filosóficas (Online) instname:Universidade do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte (UERN) instacron:UERN |
instname_str |
Universidade do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte (UERN) |
instacron_str |
UERN |
institution |
UERN |
reponame_str |
Trilhas Filosóficas (Online) |
collection |
Trilhas Filosóficas (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Trilhas Filosóficas (Online) - Universidade do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte (UERN) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
trilhasfilosoficas@uern.br || marcos_erico@yahoo.com.br |
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1797240256220626944 |