Giving up logical atomism? Some remarks on Wittgenstein’s Some remarks on logical form (1929)
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19023 |
Resumo: | Elementary (atomic) and complex structures can be characterized with respect to its composition as well as to its decomposition. (a) The rules to (de-)compose elementary structures are non-recursive. (b) The rules to (de-)compose complex structures are usually conditioned and recursive. Using this differentiation four aspects of logical atomism with respect to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are discussed: (atomic) facts, elementary propositions, objects/names and substitution rule. With respect to these aspects we investigate Wittgenstein’s modifications of his position towards logical atomism in Some Remarks on Logical Form. Against Wittgenstein’s position the consequences of using truth-functions within atomic propositions are checked. Finally we discuss analogies between the exclusion of atomic propositions on colour and the exclusion of atomic propositions describing positions of chess pieces on a board. The mutual exclusion of descriptions is related to the structure of the relevant logical space relative to the basic rules of the game. These considerations indicate one possible path to the concept of language games in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. |
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Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
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Giving up logical atomism? Some remarks on Wittgenstein’s Some remarks on logical form (1929)Logical Atomism. Recursiviness. Truth Functionality. Middle Wittgenstein. Tractatus.Atomismo lógico. Recursividade. Vero-funcionalidade. Wittgenstein intermediário. Tractatus.Elementary (atomic) and complex structures can be characterized with respect to its composition as well as to its decomposition. (a) The rules to (de-)compose elementary structures are non-recursive. (b) The rules to (de-)compose complex structures are usually conditioned and recursive. Using this differentiation four aspects of logical atomism with respect to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are discussed: (atomic) facts, elementary propositions, objects/names and substitution rule. With respect to these aspects we investigate Wittgenstein’s modifications of his position towards logical atomism in Some Remarks on Logical Form. Against Wittgenstein’s position the consequences of using truth-functions within atomic propositions are checked. Finally we discuss analogies between the exclusion of atomic propositions on colour and the exclusion of atomic propositions describing positions of chess pieces on a board. The mutual exclusion of descriptions is related to the structure of the relevant logical space relative to the basic rules of the game. These considerations indicate one possible path to the concept of language games in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.Estruturas elementares (atômicas) e complexas podem ser caracterizadas tanto em relação a sua composição quanto em relação a sua decomposição. (a) as regras para (de-)compor estruturas elementares não são recursivas. (b) As regras para (de-)compor estruturas complexas são comumente condicionadas e recursivas. Ao usar esta diferenciação quatro aspectos do atomismo lógico do Tractatus de Wittgenstein são discutidos: fatos (atômicos), proposições elementares, objetos/nomes e regras de substituição. Considerando estes aspectos nós investigamos as modificações de sua posição em relação ao atomismo lógico em Some Remarks on Logical Form. Contra a posição de Wittgenstein as consequencias de se usar funções de verdade dentro de proposições atômicas são analisadas. Finalmente, nós discutimos analogias entre a exclusão de proposições atômicas descrevendo posições das pecas de xadrez em um tabuleiro. A exclusão mútua de descrições é relacionada à estrutura do espaço lógico relativo às regras básicas do jogo. Estas considerações indicam um possível caminho para o conceito de jogos de linguagem na Filosofia tardia de Wittgenstein.Universidade Federal do Ceará2013-07-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19023Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 10Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 10Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 101984-42551984-4247reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCporhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19023/29742Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentosinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMax, Ingolf2021-03-11T17:09:25Zoai:periodicos.ufc:article/19023Revistahttp://www.filosofia.ufc.br/argumentosPUBhttp://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/oaiargumentos@ufc.br||1984-42551984-4247opendoar:2021-03-11T17:09:25Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Giving up logical atomism? Some remarks on Wittgenstein’s Some remarks on logical form (1929) |
title |
Giving up logical atomism? Some remarks on Wittgenstein’s Some remarks on logical form (1929) |
spellingShingle |
Giving up logical atomism? Some remarks on Wittgenstein’s Some remarks on logical form (1929) Max, Ingolf Logical Atomism. Recursiviness. Truth Functionality. Middle Wittgenstein. Tractatus. Atomismo lógico. Recursividade. Vero-funcionalidade. Wittgenstein intermediário. Tractatus. |
title_short |
Giving up logical atomism? Some remarks on Wittgenstein’s Some remarks on logical form (1929) |
title_full |
Giving up logical atomism? Some remarks on Wittgenstein’s Some remarks on logical form (1929) |
title_fullStr |
Giving up logical atomism? Some remarks on Wittgenstein’s Some remarks on logical form (1929) |
title_full_unstemmed |
Giving up logical atomism? Some remarks on Wittgenstein’s Some remarks on logical form (1929) |
title_sort |
Giving up logical atomism? Some remarks on Wittgenstein’s Some remarks on logical form (1929) |
author |
Max, Ingolf |
author_facet |
Max, Ingolf |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Max, Ingolf |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Logical Atomism. Recursiviness. Truth Functionality. Middle Wittgenstein. Tractatus. Atomismo lógico. Recursividade. Vero-funcionalidade. Wittgenstein intermediário. Tractatus. |
topic |
Logical Atomism. Recursiviness. Truth Functionality. Middle Wittgenstein. Tractatus. Atomismo lógico. Recursividade. Vero-funcionalidade. Wittgenstein intermediário. Tractatus. |
description |
Elementary (atomic) and complex structures can be characterized with respect to its composition as well as to its decomposition. (a) The rules to (de-)compose elementary structures are non-recursive. (b) The rules to (de-)compose complex structures are usually conditioned and recursive. Using this differentiation four aspects of logical atomism with respect to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are discussed: (atomic) facts, elementary propositions, objects/names and substitution rule. With respect to these aspects we investigate Wittgenstein’s modifications of his position towards logical atomism in Some Remarks on Logical Form. Against Wittgenstein’s position the consequences of using truth-functions within atomic propositions are checked. Finally we discuss analogies between the exclusion of atomic propositions on colour and the exclusion of atomic propositions describing positions of chess pieces on a board. The mutual exclusion of descriptions is related to the structure of the relevant logical space relative to the basic rules of the game. These considerations indicate one possible path to the concept of language games in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-07-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19023 |
url |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19023 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/19023/29742 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2017 Argumentos |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal do Ceará |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; No 10 Argumentos - Periódico de Filosofia; Núm. 10 Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia; n. 10 1984-4255 1984-4247 reponame:Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) instacron:UFC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
instacron_str |
UFC |
institution |
UFC |
reponame_str |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
collection |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
argumentos@ufc.br|| |
_version_ |
1797068845472546817 |