Verticality and horizontality of meaning in Wittgenstein

• Autor(a) principal: de Matos Nunes Filho, Lauro
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Outros Autores: Mendes Rocha, Renato
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Argumentos : Revista de Filosofia (Online)
• Texto Completo: http://periodicos.ufc.br/argumentos/article/view/78047
• topic: Meaning. Ontology. Language-games. Meaning as use.; Sentido. Ontologia. Jogos de Linguagem. Significado como uso.

In this paper we propose a new reading to the notion of sense in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to a notion of meaning in the Philosophical Investigations. For us, this move is grounded on the ontological shift that occurs between the two phases. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein develops an extensional ontology, whereas in the Investigations he makes use of an intensional ontology. We believe that this change occurs because Wittgenstein carries out an internalization of the ontology in the language, which did not occur in the first phase. This internalization of an ontology is what we will call the horizontalization of meaning. In contrast to this horizontalization of meaning there is in the Tractatus a verticalization of sense as a residue of Fregean referentialism. As we will see, this change is the result of the implementation of the notion of meaning as use (Gebraucht).