Propriedade intelectual e inovação: observações a partir da complexidade

• Autor(a) principal: Arrabal, Alejandro Knaesel
• Data de Publicação: 2018
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
• Texto Completo: http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/43758
• topic: Propriedade Intelectual; Inovação; Complexidade; Originalidade; Novidade

This article deals of Intellectual Property in the face of the social transformations arising from Innovation. Part of the complexity that marks the contemporary life and puts under question the factors that separate, in the plane of dogmatic and normative foundation, the subjective originality that permeates the Copyright of the objective novelty that conditions Industrial Property. Based on a systemic-dialogical approach and operated through a bibliographical and documentary review, the research finds its results described in three moments. The first deals with the concept of complexity, having as main theoretical vector the thinking by Edgar Morin. In the sequence, the text deals with Intellectual Property, especially in relation to the concepts of originality and novelty, seen as structural vectors of the decoupling between Copyright and Industrial Property. Finally, the study deals with the texture of Intellectual Property and Innovation as a phenomenon related to the universalization of market logic and access to information. The research points to the necessary re-signification of the characteristic contours of Intellectual Property, which implies dissubjectivity the originality inherent to Copyright, and to disobjectify the novelty in the context of Industrial Property. In other words, it is necessary to shift the originality and novelty, as criteria adopted to the constitution of Intellectual Property rights, to the field systemic relations. The disjunction between Copyright and Industrial Property contributes to author exclusivity and industrial monopoly to become promoters of an irresponsible atomism. In this sense, intellectual rights can not be treated in a polarized and reductive way, identifying only with the private appropriation of knowledge.