Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2018 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
Texto Completo: | http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/71872 |
Resumo: | In an impermanent world, is anything fixed? Could we point at the landscape and proudly declare, like Russell, "The grass is green"? In Über Gewißheit (On Certainty), Wittgenstein develops G. E. Moore's disconcertingly direct objection to the immaterialist skeptical doubt, concluding that the grass is indeed green, though not in the expected sense. Something is fixed, but not the reality pinpointed by Russell and Moore; rather, it is the conditions of our language games, and thus of doubt itself. Our thesis is a logical reconstruction of the conception of certainty investigated by Wittgenstein and inspired by Moore. Our central negative dispute is the rejection of the normative conception of certainty, proposed in Über Gewißheit and widely adopted in the exegetical literature; the positive one is a reconstruction of certainty as a new form of analyticity, dual to Moore's paradox or, broadly speaking, as the logical limit of the conceivable. In particular, we will argue that the grammatical conception of certainty is circular because it bases language games on a language game; and inconsistent, for taking certainties as unequivocal rules, a contradiction in terms. We also contest the very concept of unequivocity, which we have shown to be logical necessity “in disguise”. This suggests that a logicist resumption is a rather consistent development of the language model in Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), if we recognize that the possibility of a language game is conditioned by certain facts. Thus, we outline a logical view of certainty, inspired by Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in which certainties are analytical presuppositions, and the domain of bipolarity includes propositions and rules, given the mutual dependence between doubt and equivocity. Finally, we apply these results to some established topics of the epistemological debate. In particular: we show that the normative vision of certainty conflicts with its externality, which we outline in a reliabilist key; whereas the grammatical or normative approach fails as an antiskeptical argument, but a more satisfying objection is possible, taking certainty under a logical key; finally, we argue that such a logical reading is also a more appropriate objection to Methodist challenges to the foundational status of certainty, and to those that aim at its coherentist aspect, such as the input problem. |
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Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxisLogical certainty: certainty beyond praxisCertezaLógicaEpistemologiaIn an impermanent world, is anything fixed? Could we point at the landscape and proudly declare, like Russell, "The grass is green"? In Über Gewißheit (On Certainty), Wittgenstein develops G. E. Moore's disconcertingly direct objection to the immaterialist skeptical doubt, concluding that the grass is indeed green, though not in the expected sense. Something is fixed, but not the reality pinpointed by Russell and Moore; rather, it is the conditions of our language games, and thus of doubt itself. Our thesis is a logical reconstruction of the conception of certainty investigated by Wittgenstein and inspired by Moore. Our central negative dispute is the rejection of the normative conception of certainty, proposed in Über Gewißheit and widely adopted in the exegetical literature; the positive one is a reconstruction of certainty as a new form of analyticity, dual to Moore's paradox or, broadly speaking, as the logical limit of the conceivable. In particular, we will argue that the grammatical conception of certainty is circular because it bases language games on a language game; and inconsistent, for taking certainties as unequivocal rules, a contradiction in terms. We also contest the very concept of unequivocity, which we have shown to be logical necessity “in disguise”. This suggests that a logicist resumption is a rather consistent development of the language model in Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), if we recognize that the possibility of a language game is conditioned by certain facts. Thus, we outline a logical view of certainty, inspired by Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in which certainties are analytical presuppositions, and the domain of bipolarity includes propositions and rules, given the mutual dependence between doubt and equivocity. Finally, we apply these results to some established topics of the epistemological debate. In particular: we show that the normative vision of certainty conflicts with its externality, which we outline in a reliabilist key; whereas the grammatical or normative approach fails as an antiskeptical argument, but a more satisfying objection is possible, taking certainty under a logical key; finally, we argue that such a logical reading is also a more appropriate objection to Methodist challenges to the foundational status of certainty, and to those that aim at its coherentist aspect, such as the input problem.Em um mundo impermanente, há algo fixo? Poderíamos apontar para a paisagem e declarar orgulhosos, como Russell, “A relva é verde”? Em Über Gewißheit (Da Certeza), Wittgenstein desenvolve a objeção desconcertantemente direta de G. E. Moore à dúvida cética imaterialista, e conclui que a relva, com efeito, é verde, embora não no sentido esperado. Algo está fixo, mas não a realidade apontável almejada por Russell e por Moore, senão as condições dos nossos jogos de linguagem, e assim da própria dúvida. Nosso trabalho é uma reconstrução lógica da concepção de certeza investigada por Wittgenstein e inspirada por Moore. Nossa disputa negativa central é a rejeição da concepção normativa da certeza, proposta em Über Gewißheit e largamente adotada na literatura exegética; a positiva, uma reconstrução da certeza enquanto uma nova forma de analiticidade, dual ao paradoxo de Moore (em sentido lato, como limite lógico do concebível). Em particular, defenderemos que a concepção gramatical da certeza é circular, por fundamentar jogos de linguagem num jogo de linguagem; e inconsistente, por tomar certezas como regras inequívocas, uma contradição em termos. Contestamos também o próprio conceito de inequivocidade, que mostramos disfarçar uma necessidade lógica. Isto sugere que uma retomada logicista é um desenvolvimento bastante consequente do modelo de linguagem em Philosophische Untersuchungen (Investigações Filosóficas), se reconhecemos que a possibilidade de um jogo de linguagem é condicionada por certos fatos. Assim, delineamos uma visão lógica da certeza, inspirada em Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, em que certezas são pressupostos analíticos, e o domínio da bipolaridade inclui proposições e regras, dada a mútua dependência entre dubitabilidade e equivocidade. Por fim, aplicamos tais resultados a alguns tópicos estabelecidos do debate epistemológico. Em particular: mostramos que a visão normativa da certeza conflitua com seu externismo, que delineamos em clave confiabilista; que a abordagem gramatical ou normativa falha como argumento anticético, mas uma objeção mais satisfatória é possível, tomando certezas sob chave lógica; e argumentamos, por fim, que tal leitura lógica é também mais adequada como objeção a desafios metodistas ao aporte fundacional da certeza, e àqueles que visam seu aspecto coerentista, como o problema do input.Leclerc, AndréMonte, Daniel Liberalino2023-04-25T15:10:31Z2023-04-25T15:10:31Z2018info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisapplication/pdfMONTE, Daniel Liberalino. Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis. 2018. 157 f. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, 2018.http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/71872porreponame:Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instname:Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)instacron:UFCinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2023-04-25T15:10:31Zoai:repositorio.ufc.br:riufc/71872Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://www.repositorio.ufc.br/ri-oai/requestbu@ufc.br || repositorio@ufc.bropendoar:2024-09-11T18:32:47.675619Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis Logical certainty: certainty beyond praxis |
title |
Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis |
spellingShingle |
Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis Monte, Daniel Liberalino Certeza Lógica Epistemologia |
title_short |
Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis |
title_full |
Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis |
title_fullStr |
Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis |
title_full_unstemmed |
Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis |
title_sort |
Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis |
author |
Monte, Daniel Liberalino |
author_facet |
Monte, Daniel Liberalino |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Leclerc, André |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Monte, Daniel Liberalino |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Certeza Lógica Epistemologia |
topic |
Certeza Lógica Epistemologia |
description |
In an impermanent world, is anything fixed? Could we point at the landscape and proudly declare, like Russell, "The grass is green"? In Über Gewißheit (On Certainty), Wittgenstein develops G. E. Moore's disconcertingly direct objection to the immaterialist skeptical doubt, concluding that the grass is indeed green, though not in the expected sense. Something is fixed, but not the reality pinpointed by Russell and Moore; rather, it is the conditions of our language games, and thus of doubt itself. Our thesis is a logical reconstruction of the conception of certainty investigated by Wittgenstein and inspired by Moore. Our central negative dispute is the rejection of the normative conception of certainty, proposed in Über Gewißheit and widely adopted in the exegetical literature; the positive one is a reconstruction of certainty as a new form of analyticity, dual to Moore's paradox or, broadly speaking, as the logical limit of the conceivable. In particular, we will argue that the grammatical conception of certainty is circular because it bases language games on a language game; and inconsistent, for taking certainties as unequivocal rules, a contradiction in terms. We also contest the very concept of unequivocity, which we have shown to be logical necessity “in disguise”. This suggests that a logicist resumption is a rather consistent development of the language model in Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), if we recognize that the possibility of a language game is conditioned by certain facts. Thus, we outline a logical view of certainty, inspired by Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in which certainties are analytical presuppositions, and the domain of bipolarity includes propositions and rules, given the mutual dependence between doubt and equivocity. Finally, we apply these results to some established topics of the epistemological debate. In particular: we show that the normative vision of certainty conflicts with its externality, which we outline in a reliabilist key; whereas the grammatical or normative approach fails as an antiskeptical argument, but a more satisfying objection is possible, taking certainty under a logical key; finally, we argue that such a logical reading is also a more appropriate objection to Methodist challenges to the foundational status of certainty, and to those that aim at its coherentist aspect, such as the input problem. |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018 2023-04-25T15:10:31Z 2023-04-25T15:10:31Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
MONTE, Daniel Liberalino. Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis. 2018. 157 f. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, 2018. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/71872 |
identifier_str_mv |
MONTE, Daniel Liberalino. Certeza lógica: certeza além da práxis. 2018. 157 f. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza, 2018. |
url |
http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/71872 |
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openAccess |
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Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
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Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) - Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC) |
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