Efeitos da credibilidade do Banco Central no combate a inflação

• Autor(a) principal: Goes, Carlos Roberto Chagas
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)
• dARK ID: ark:/83112/0013000022fnz
• Texto Completo: http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/15275
• topic: Banco Central do Brasil; Curva de Phillips; Inflação

According to Svensson (1999) disinflationary policies of a central bank with low credibility tend to be less efficient and generate more costs for society, in terms of losses of welfare, due to necessity of an adoption of one larger interest rate for a long time than in one economy where there is a monetary authority with larger credibility. Due to importance of price level stability and costs involved in its maintenance, the present research has as objective to verify central bank credibility effects in fight against Brazilian inflation. This objective is done through the analysis of private agents’ behavior on creating of the inflation expectations through different regimes of central bank credibility. The methodology used consists in the estimation of a hybrid Phillips curve with threshold effects whose indicator variables from regimes are credibility indexes suggested by literature. The results showed which hybrid Phillips curve specification is significant solely in regime of high credibility and which the specification where there are only adaptive expectations is the most appropriated in regime of low credibility. Moreover, there are evidences of a vertical Phillips curve in regime of high credibility.