Risco bancÃrio e disciplina de mercado

• Autor(a) principal: RogÃrio Moreira de Siqueira
• Data de Publicação: 2009
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFC
• Texto Completo: http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=10168
• topic: Risco BancÃrio; Risco Moral; Estrutura de Propriedade; Bank risk; Moral Hazard; Ownership Structure; CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS

This work search to study as the agency costs and the moral hazard affect the decisions of the Brazilian banks as for the risk level that it are willing to assume, once determining the behavior of these banks is easier to formulate preventive politics to the occurrence of crises. As contribution in relation to the existent literature can stand out the attempt to model the variance taking into account the problem of the conditional heteroscedasticity and to verify as the banks have if held durant during the crises observed in the last decade. The results of this work point that the systemic risk was less expressive than the specific risk in the composition of the total risk and that, given the characteristics of the Brazilian banks, the property structure and the franchise value tend to affect the total and specific risks in an inverse way, however in what concerns the systematic risk no there is a very defined relationship.