Abusive constitutionalism
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Revista Jurídica da Ufersa |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufersa.edu.br/rejur/article/view/9608 |
Resumo: | This paper identifies an increasingly important phenomenon: the use of mechanisms of constitutional change to erode the democratic order. A rash of recent incidents in a diverse group of countries such as Hungary, Egypt, and Venezuela has shown that the tools of constitutional amendment and replacement can be used by would-be autocrats to undermine democracy with relative ease. Since military coups and other blatant ruptures in the constitutional order have fallen out of favor, actors instead rework the constitutional order with subtle changes in order to make themselves difficult to dislodge and to disable or pack courts and other accountability institutions. The resulting regimes continue to have elections and are not fully authoritarian, but they are significantly less democratic than they were previously. Even worse, the problem of abusive constitutionalism remains largely unresolved, since democratic defense mechanisms in both comparative constitutional law and international law are largely ineffective against it. Some of the mechanisms most relied upon in the literature — such as the German conception of militant democracy and the unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine — are in fact either difficult to deploy against the threat of abusive constitutionalism or easily avoidable by would-be authoritarian actors. This Article suggests ways to reinforce democracy against these threats while acknowledging the extreme difficulty of the task. The phenomenon of abusive constitutionalism should impact the conversation about how the fields of comparative constitutional law and international law might best be leveraged to protect new democracies. |
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Abusive constitutionalismConstitucionalismo abusivoThis paper identifies an increasingly important phenomenon: the use of mechanisms of constitutional change to erode the democratic order. A rash of recent incidents in a diverse group of countries such as Hungary, Egypt, and Venezuela has shown that the tools of constitutional amendment and replacement can be used by would-be autocrats to undermine democracy with relative ease. Since military coups and other blatant ruptures in the constitutional order have fallen out of favor, actors instead rework the constitutional order with subtle changes in order to make themselves difficult to dislodge and to disable or pack courts and other accountability institutions. The resulting regimes continue to have elections and are not fully authoritarian, but they are significantly less democratic than they were previously. Even worse, the problem of abusive constitutionalism remains largely unresolved, since democratic defense mechanisms in both comparative constitutional law and international law are largely ineffective against it. Some of the mechanisms most relied upon in the literature — such as the German conception of militant democracy and the unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine — are in fact either difficult to deploy against the threat of abusive constitutionalism or easily avoidable by would-be authoritarian actors. This Article suggests ways to reinforce democracy against these threats while acknowledging the extreme difficulty of the task. The phenomenon of abusive constitutionalism should impact the conversation about how the fields of comparative constitutional law and international law might best be leveraged to protect new democracies.Tradução: Rafael Lamera Giesta Cabral e Ulisses Levy Silvério dos Reis Este artigo identifica um fenômeno cada vez mais importante: o uso de mecanismos de mudança constitucional para corroer a ordem democrática. Uma onda de incidentes recentes em um grupo diversificado de países, como Hungria, Egito e Venezuela, mostrou que as ferramentas de modificações e emendas constitucionais podem ser usadas por pretensos autocratas para minar a democracia com relativa facilidade. Como golpes militares e outras rupturas flagrantes na ordem constitucional caíram em desuso, os atores refazem a ordem constitucional com mudanças sutis, a fim de dificultar a sua substituição e retirar dos tribunais a capacidade de fiscalizar os seus atos. Os regimes resultantes dessas manobras continuam a ter eleições e não são totalmente autoritários, mas são significativamente menos democráticos do que eram anteriormente. Pior ainda, o problema do constitucionalismo abusivo permanece em grande parte não resolvido, uma vez que os mecanismos de defesa democrática, tanto no direito constitucional comparado quanto no direito internacional, são amplamente ineficazes contra ele. Alguns dos mecanismos mais citados na literatura - como a concepção alemã de democracia militante e a doutrina das emendas constitucionais inconstitucionais - são difíceis de implantar contra a ameaça do constitucionalismo abusivo ou facilmente evitáveis por esses atores autoritários. Este artigo sugere maneiras de reforçar a democracia contra essas ameaças, embora reconheça a extrema dificuldade da tarefa. O fenômeno do constitucionalismo abusivo deve impactar o debate sobre como os campos do direito constitucional comparado e do direito internacional podem ser mais bem aproveitados para proteger novas democracias.Universidade Federal Rural do Semi-Árido2020-07-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufersa.edu.br/rejur/article/view/960810.21708/issn2526-9488.v4.n7.p17-71.2020UFERSA's Law Review; Vol. 4 No. 7 (2020): UFERSA´s Law Review; 17-71Revista Jurídica da UFERSA; v. 4 n. 7 (2020): Revista Jurídica da UFERSA; 17-712526-948810.21708/issn2526-9488.v4.n7.2020reponame:Revista Jurídica da Ufersainstname:Universidade Federal Rural do Semi-Árido (UFERSA)instacron:UFERSAporhttps://periodicos.ufersa.edu.br/rejur/article/view/9608/10261Copyright (c) 2020 Revista Jurídica da UFERSAhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLandau, David2023-01-18T16:07:42Zoai:ojs.periodicos.ufersa.edu.br:article/9608Revistahttps://periodicos.ufersa.edu.br/index.php/rejur/indexPUBhttps://periodicos.ufersa.edu.br/index.php/rejur/oairejur.direito@ufersa.edu.br||2526-94882526-9488opendoar:2023-01-18T16:07:42Revista Jurídica da Ufersa - Universidade Federal Rural do Semi-Árido (UFERSA)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Abusive constitutionalism Constitucionalismo abusivo |
title |
Abusive constitutionalism |
spellingShingle |
Abusive constitutionalism Landau, David |
title_short |
Abusive constitutionalism |
title_full |
Abusive constitutionalism |
title_fullStr |
Abusive constitutionalism |
title_full_unstemmed |
Abusive constitutionalism |
title_sort |
Abusive constitutionalism |
author |
Landau, David |
author_facet |
Landau, David |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Landau, David |
description |
This paper identifies an increasingly important phenomenon: the use of mechanisms of constitutional change to erode the democratic order. A rash of recent incidents in a diverse group of countries such as Hungary, Egypt, and Venezuela has shown that the tools of constitutional amendment and replacement can be used by would-be autocrats to undermine democracy with relative ease. Since military coups and other blatant ruptures in the constitutional order have fallen out of favor, actors instead rework the constitutional order with subtle changes in order to make themselves difficult to dislodge and to disable or pack courts and other accountability institutions. The resulting regimes continue to have elections and are not fully authoritarian, but they are significantly less democratic than they were previously. Even worse, the problem of abusive constitutionalism remains largely unresolved, since democratic defense mechanisms in both comparative constitutional law and international law are largely ineffective against it. Some of the mechanisms most relied upon in the literature — such as the German conception of militant democracy and the unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine — are in fact either difficult to deploy against the threat of abusive constitutionalism or easily avoidable by would-be authoritarian actors. This Article suggests ways to reinforce democracy against these threats while acknowledging the extreme difficulty of the task. The phenomenon of abusive constitutionalism should impact the conversation about how the fields of comparative constitutional law and international law might best be leveraged to protect new democracies. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-07-27 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufersa.edu.br/rejur/article/view/9608 10.21708/issn2526-9488.v4.n7.p17-71.2020 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufersa.edu.br/rejur/article/view/9608 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.21708/issn2526-9488.v4.n7.p17-71.2020 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufersa.edu.br/rejur/article/view/9608/10261 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Revista Jurídica da UFERSA http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Revista Jurídica da UFERSA http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal Rural do Semi-Árido |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Federal Rural do Semi-Árido |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
UFERSA's Law Review; Vol. 4 No. 7 (2020): UFERSA´s Law Review; 17-71 Revista Jurídica da UFERSA; v. 4 n. 7 (2020): Revista Jurídica da UFERSA; 17-71 2526-9488 10.21708/issn2526-9488.v4.n7.2020 reponame:Revista Jurídica da Ufersa instname:Universidade Federal Rural do Semi-Árido (UFERSA) instacron:UFERSA |
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Universidade Federal Rural do Semi-Árido (UFERSA) |
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UFERSA |
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UFERSA |
reponame_str |
Revista Jurídica da Ufersa |
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Revista Jurídica da Ufersa |
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Revista Jurídica da Ufersa - Universidade Federal Rural do Semi-Árido (UFERSA) |
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rejur.direito@ufersa.edu.br|| |
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