O eleitor radical e o paradoxo dos sistemas eleitorais conflitantes

• Autor(a) principal: Simoyama, Felipe
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Outros Autores: Bueno, Ricardo Luiz Pereira
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Caderno Eletrônico de Ciências Sociais
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufes.br/cadecs/article/view/39676

The available studies on the impact of the median voter theorem are mostly related to the majority rule voting system, e.g., the elections for the executive branches in Brazil. On the other hand, there is a consensus that this theorem is not appropriate to describe the incentives under proportional open-list voting systems, but this assertion lacks formal demonstration through the lenses of game theory. The purpose of this work is to create a game theory-based model focused on open-list systems in order to describe the players’ strategic behavior. Besides, it is proposed a possible conflict emerged from the fact that these two different systems work simultaneously, as well as its impact on public policies in Brazil. The results suggest that different voting systems provide players with different incentives, and thus different strategies emerge. This creates a paradox that could have an impact on the stability of the public policy process in Brazil. This study shows that there are still plenty of possibilities of applying game theory in political science, specially building simple models for unexplored themes and adding sophistication to the ones that already exists.